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Essays on Misallocation and Firm Regulations
Sakai Ando
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on misallocation and firm regulations.
The first chapter investigates how size-dependent firm regulation policies can mitigate mi-
sallocation. The second chapter uses the same framework as the first to explore the intuition
of a theoretically more subtle concept of misallocation. The third chapter analyzes a more
specific firm regulation that targets at financial dealers.
In chapter 1, I study the welfare implications of size-dependent firm regulation policies
(SDPs) in the presence of entrepreneurial risks. Although SDP has been considered a source
of misallocation, I show that, once entrepreneurial risks are taken into account, SDP might
improve efficiency. Quantitatively, I show that, based on French data, removing the SDP
leads to output and welfare loss by 1.5% and 1.3%, respectively, in opposition to the output
gain reported by the previous literature that abstracts from risks. Qualitatively, I solve an
optimal non-linear SDP problem and show that the observed SDP shares certain features
with the optimal SDP. The analysis uncovers a novel trade-off between the inefficiencies of
the intensive and extensive margins. In extension, it is shown that (1) whether SDPs improve
efficiency depends on the level of financial development and (2) capital accumulation and
consumption-smoothing motive further justify SDPs.
In chapter 2, which is a joint work with Misaki Matsumura, we use the same competi-
tive entrepreneurship model to investigate the economic intuition of constrained inefficiency
caused by uninsurable risks. Although the constrained efficiency of various models has been
studied in the literature, the economic intuition of why the constrained planner's interven-
tion yields an improvement is usually not available. The competitive entrepreneurship model
is particularly suitable for seeing the logic of constrained inefficiency since the structure of
the market equilibrium is characterized by the indifference condition instead of the marginal
condition. To illustrate this point, we contrast the competitive entrepreneurship model with
simple versions of the Aiyagari model and the Krebs model.
In chapter 3, which is also a joint work with Misaki Matsumura, we build a general
equilibrium model to analyze the impact of the Volcker rule, a dealer regulation imposed after
the financial crisis, on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications on
the welfare of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility
and the dealer's profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market
participants are better off due to the dealer's risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to
clarify the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results as well as the fragility of
the conventional wisdom about price quality are discussed by incorporating dynamics and
endogenizing information acquisition.
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Size-dependent policies (SDPs) that preferentially treat small firms are ubiquitous. For
instance, in France, firms that hire more than 50 workers have to pay additional regulatory
costs, such as higher tax rates and more stringent labor regulations. Such SDPs naturally
create the bunching behavior in the firm size distribution as in Fig.1.1, since some big
firms rationally remain small to save regulatory costs. The literature has focused on the
misallocation from the bunching behavior, reporting that the removal of SDPs leads to
output gain by .02 ∼ 4% (Gourio and Roys [2014], Garicano et al. [2016]).
In this paper, I argue that our understanding about SDPs can change drastically if
we take into account the fact that firm creation is risky. Specifically, I show that, once the
analysis incorporates uninsurable entrepreneurial risks, SDPs can generate higher output and
welfare, contributing to net efficiency gains despite the remarkable bunching behavior. The
key observation is that, when entrepreneurial risks cause insufficient firm creation relative
to the Pareto efficient level, SDPs could mitigate the market failure by supporting firm
creation. Put differently, if the economy has inefficiencies in the extensive margin, it might
be efficiency-enhancing to distort the intensive margin. This is the novel trade-off that this
paper uncovers and is at the heart of the following quantitative and qualitative analyses that
generate the opposite policy implications to the previous literature.
The key assumption behind the above argument is that entrepreneurial risks deter firm
creation. There are several empirical studies that support the assumption. For instance,
Hombert et al. [2014] study the French unemployment insurance reform in 2002 and find a
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Figure 1.1: The number of firms by employment size in France. The rise and drop at the
employment size of 50 reflect the endogenous reaction of firms to the regulation threshold
50, above which firms are subject to higher tax and heavier labor regulations. The sample
includes all the firms in Amadeus 2006 with employment size between 31 and 69.
that the Canadian maternity leave policy reform mitigates the downside risks of losing safe
job options and increases entrepreneurship. We can also observe the cross-sectional negative
correlation between the downside risks and firm creation as in Fig.1.2.
To illustrate the mechanism and quantify the welfare consequence of SDPs, I extend
the standard occupation choice model a la Lucas [1978] (and its descendant Garicano et al.
[2016]) by adding entrepreneurial risks. Specifically, in occupation choice, agents choose to
become either entrepreneurs or workers. Due to the decreasing returns to scale production
technology of entrepreneurs, there is a well-defined number of firms in equilibrium.
The key friction is the uninsurable entrepreneurial risks that agents face as of occupation
choice, modeled as the uncertainty about future productivity of the firms that entrepreneurs
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Figure 1.2: Negative correlation between fear of failure rate and entrepreneurship. Fear of
failure rate is the percentage of 18 − 64 population perceiving good opportunities to start
a business who indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from setting up a business.
Entrepreneurship is the percentage of the population of 18 − 65 years old who is either
a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business. The plot pools yearly data
2001 − 2016 for all available countries from 28 to 76 depending on years. The definition of
high-income countries and others follow the categorization of the World Bank. Data: Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor.
sure whether the business profit is higher or lower than the foregone wage, discouraging
risk-averse agents from creating firms. Theoretically, the markets are incomplete due to
uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risks and therefore the firm creation in the laissez-
faire economy is insufficient compared to the Pareto efficient level. This market failure is
absent from previous literature and changes the policy implications of SDPs.
The mechanism by which SDPs improve efficiency relies on SDPs facilitating firm cre-
ation. Specifically, under the SDPs, big firms pay regulatory costs, so that they limit the
number of employees and their profitability deteriorates. The lower labor demand from big
firms implies more firm creation in equilibrium since agents are either entrepreneurs or wor-
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kers. In other words, SDPs prevent big firms from absorbing human resources that could
otherwise be devoted to entrepreneurship. Moreover, the fact that big firms are less profita-
ble makes entrepreneurship less attractive. To offset the resulting increase in the supply of
salary workers and reflect weaker labor demand from firms, wage declines in general equi-
librium. This is good news for small firms because they do not face regulations and can
enjoy lower labor costs. As a consequence, the profitability of small firms improves. From
the ex-ante point of view, this means that entrepreneurs face lower downside risks since,
even when businesses end up being small or unprofitable, they can earn more than in the
laissez-faire economy. As a result of these channels, the economy with SDPs features more
firm creation.
The increase in the number of firms can raise output and welfare in the presence of
entrepreneurial risks. Intuitively, in the laissez-faire economy with entrepreneurial risks,
entrepreneurs produce and consume more on average for the compensation of risk takings.
Therefore, SDPs that change the occupation of agents from workers to entrepreneurs can
generate positive net output gain, as long as the output loss from bunching is not too large.
Accordingly, the higher output and the lower entrepreneurial risks can Pareto improve the
laissez-faire economy. Whether the efficiency gain from these channels outweighs the effi-
ciency loss of bunching is a non-trivial question and therefore necessitates the quantification
exercise.
To quantify the welfare impact, I conduct the same counterfactual analysis as Garicano
et al. [2016] except that my model has entrepreneurial risks. Importantly, I use the same
specification and data so that I can isolate the pure implication of entrepreneurial risks. My
counterfactual analysis based on French data reveals that removing SDPs decreases output
5
by 1.5% and welfare in wage unit by 1.27%. The result is in sharp contrast to Garicano et al.
[2016] who report that removing SDPs increases output by .02 ∼ 4%.
In terms of implications, the result not only uncovers the channel through which entre-
preneurial risks can justify SDPs but also poses a caveat to the misallocation measurement
literature in general including Hsieh and Klenow [2009]. In particular, misallocation measu-
rement exercises typically assume that marginal products equalize in the efficient benchmark
and measure the deviation from it. The result implies that using such benchmark can be
misleading since it might be better to have some wedges among marginal products when the
economy has uninsurable entrepreneurial risks. In other words, the trade-off between the
inefficiencies of the intensive and extensive margins uncovered in the analysis highlights a
limitation of the core logic of the typical misallocation measurement that focuses only on
the inefficiency of the intensive margin.
To explore the novel trade-off, I study the non-linear SDP that optimally creates wedges
among firms. I solve the optimal SDP problem using the mechanism design approach and
show that the optimal SDP and the observed threshold type SDP share qualitative features.
Specifically, both the optimal and threshold type SDPs (1) distort medium-sized firms more
than the smallest and biggest and (2) feature a larger number of firms compared to the laissez-
faire economy. In addition, calibrated at the same parameter values as the quantification
exercise, the optimal SDP subsidizes small firms and taxes big firms. In this sense, the
observed SDP has efficiency-enhancing properties.
As a novel policy implication, these analyses imply that SDPs can improve efficiency
against the current understanding of the literature.
After making the point, I extend my analysis by examining its generality. A natural
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question is whether entrepreneurial risks always justify SDPs. I argue that the answer is
negative, especially when the laissez-faire economy creates an excessive number of firms. As
an example of excessive firm creation, I study the financial frictions that prevent firms from
expanding to their profit-maximizing sizes.
It is shown that removing SDPs improves efficiency even when there are entrepreneurial
risks if existing firms face severe financial frictions. To be concrete, one can imagine a de-
veloping country in which firms cannot expand their employment due to financial frictions.
Since firms cannot hire people, those unemployed have to do businesses on their own. As a
result, one can observe many small businesses in the economy including people engaged in
food truck businesses on the streets. I model such intuition and show that severe financial
frictions can lead to too many firms compared to the Pareto efficient level. In this situa-
tion, SDPs should be removed since the laissez-faire economy already generates an excessive
number of firms in the first place. In fact, the efficiency gains are doubled under excessive
firm creation since removing SDPs fixes both the intensive and extensive margins.
The analysis of financial frictions both deepens the policy implication and enrich our
understanding about the relationship between financial frictions and entrepreneurship. In
terms of the policy implication, the analysis implies that whether SDPs improve efficiency
depends on the level of financial development. In financially developed countries with in-
sufficient firm creation, SDPs should be kept, while in countries with immature financial
infrastructure, SDPs should be removed.
In terms of financial frictions and entrepreneurship, the claim that entrepreneurial risks
cause insufficient firm creation while financial frictions cause the opposite might be surprising
since they are both often cited as obstacles to entrepreneurship. The key to understanding the
7
apparent paradox is to recognize who faces what kind of financial frictions. If entrepreneurs
are financially constrained against the fixed cost of entry, the firm creation can be insufficient.
However, if existing firms face financial frictions against expansion and the entry cost is a
choice variable so that entrepreneurs can start small, the firm creation can be excessive.
Finally, I investigate the implications of dynamic trade-offs. To isolate the implication
of inter-temporal decisions in a tractable dynamic environment, I extend the static model
by introducing Krep-Porteus-Epstein-Zin preference (Kreps and Porteus [1978], Epstein and
Zin [1989]) and capital accumulation a la Krebs [2003]. These modeling techniques allow me
to derive a closed form solution despite the heterogeneous-agent incomplete market dynamic
model.
It is shown that consumption-smoothing motive provides a further justification for keeping
SDPs. In particular, I show that the laissez-faire economy creates insufficient firms, even
if agents are risk neutral. The idea is that, when agents prefer smooth-consumption, they
want to avoid asset fluctuation, so they do not want to take entrepreneurial risks. Such
dynamic trade-off discourages firm creation and therefore justifies SDPs. This result not
only confirms the robustness of the analysis in the static model but also highlights a force
specific to the dynamic environment.
An implication of the dynamic extension is that SDPs should be kept in an economy with
patient agents. This is because patient agents value future consumption more and therefore
have stronger consumption-smoothing motives. Theoretically, this reflects the observation
that consumption-smoothing motive is controlled not just by the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution but also by the discount factor. Thus, other things being equal, in countries
with patient agents such as ones with the culture of patience or long life-expectancy, it is
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more likely that removing SDPs exacerbates the market failure of firm creation.
1.1.1 Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it provides a novel insight into
the conventional wisdom about SDPs. Restuccia and Rogerson [2008], Guner et al. [2008]
and Garicano et al. [2016] measure the output gain from removing SDPs. While the details
of the models are different across those papers, they share the same feature that the laissez-
faire economy without SDPs is efficient. Hence, SDPs decrease output by construction. My
contribution is to show that the introduction of entrepreneurial risks might justify SDPs,
altering the understanding of SDPs being bad. Another important paper in this strand of
literature is Gourio and Roys [2014], which conduct a counterfactual analysis using a firm
dynamics model with risky TFP and entry cost. Although they obtain an output loss from
removing SDPs, the aggregate consumption and welfare increase, so their policy implication
is still to remove SDPs. In contrast, I show a case in which SDPs should be kept.
More broadly, my paper poses a caveat to the misallocation measurement exercises ba-
sed on marginal product equalization (Hsieh and Klenow [2009], Hsieh et al. [2013]). In
particular, I show that, with uninsurable entrepreneurial risks, there is a trade-off between
the efficiencies of the intensive and extensive margins, so the efficient benchmark does not
necessarily feature marginal product equalization.
The second strand of literature that I contribute studies the efficiency of firm formation.
Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979] and Kanbur [1981] are early references for risky firm forma-
tion. These papers model both risky occupation choice and non-contingent labor choice so
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the resulting market failure is not specific to the friction due to risks. To the best of my
knowledge, my paper is the first to study the market failure specific to risky occupation
choice. For other environments, Mankiw and Whinston [1986] and Suzumura and Kiyono
[1987] are early references that study the optimality of the firm entry in strategic settings.
Jaef [2012] studies the optimality of entry in the firm dynamics model of Hopenhayn [1992].
All of them emphasize excessive entry, so the results are opposite to mine.
The third strand of literature that this paper contributes to is the one on financial con-
straints and entrepreneurship as surveyed by Quadrini [2008] and Buera et al. [2015]. Evans
and Jovanovic [1989] is a seminal paper that models liquidity constraint and entrepreneurs-
hip. A non-comprehensive list of recent papers includes Buera and Shin [2013], Bohacek
and Zubricky [2012], Buera et al. [2011], Cagetti and De Nardi [2009], Kitao [2008] and Meh
[2008]. The nature of my exercise is different from these papers. While they are mainly inte-
rested in the impact of financial frictions on market equilibrium, I am interested in the impact
of financial frictions on the difference between market equilibrium and efficient allocation.
Finally, my paper contributes to dynamic macroeconomics modeling by offering a trac-
table dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous-agent, incomplete markets and
risky occupation choice. The trick behind the tractability is borrowed from Krebs [2003].
Toda [2015] and Gottardi et al. [2016] study the efficiency of the descendants of Krebs [2003].
I extend the framework to include risky occupation choice.
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1.2 Model
In this section, I present the baseline model. After discussing the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium, I use an efficiency analysis to illustrate the market failure that the SDP
mitigates. In particular, I show that the laissez-faire economy without SDP generates an
insufficient number of firms if and only if there are entrepreneurial risks.
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical risk-averse agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each
agent is endowed with one unit of indivisible labor that can be spent in running a firm or
working for a firm.
If agent i chooses to be a worker, she receives wage w independent of her entrepreneurial
productivity zi. If she chooses to be an entrepreneur, she observes her entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity zi and then decides the size of the firm measured by the number of employees n to
maximize the profit
[pi (zi, w) , n (zi, w)] = max
n≥0

zif (n)− wn n ≤ N
zif (n)− wτn− F n > N
(1.1)
where f is the production function, n (zi, w) is the associated policy function and (τ, F,N) ∈
[1,∞)× R× R+ is the SDP modeled as the variable and fixed tax that entrepreneurs have
to pay when they hire more than N . Note that once the firm hires more than N workers,
the variable cost τ ≥ 1 applies to not just the net additional workers n−N but also all the
workers. Therefore, firms have the incentive to shrink the size as in Fig.1.1 even if the fixed
component is negative F < 0 as long as the total tax payment is positive (τ − 1)wN+F > 0.
Given the payoffs of the two occupations, each agent i observes the signal si about the
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entrepreneurial productivity zi and chooses the occupation that maximizes her expected
utility. The joint distribution of the signal and productivity (s, z) is exogenously given and
denoted by G. Formally, each agent i solves
e (si, w) = arg max
e∈[0,1]
eE [u (pi (zi, w)) |si] + (1− e)u (w) (1.2)
where u is the utility function, and E [·|si] is the expectation with respect to the productivity
zi ∈ R+ conditional on the observed signal si ∈ R. If the agent chooses e = 1, she becomes
an entrepreneur, while e = 0 indicates that she becomes a worker.
I make two observations about the occupation choice problem. First, note that the choice
variable e, representing whether to become an entrepreneur, can take continuous values
e ∈ [0, 1]. This formulation allows agents to take mixed strategy when they are indifferent
between the two occupations. Second, the occupation choice is risky because the agent has to
decide the occupation before observing the productivity zi. Since the salary job is risk-free,
depending on the realization of the productivity zi, entrepreneurs might consume less than
workers in the equilibrium. In this sense, entrepreneurship involves downside risks.
Finally, the wage w clears the labor market
1−
∫
e (si, w) di =
∫
e (si, w)n (zi, w) di. (1.3)
where the left hand side is the aggregate labor supply and the right hand side denotes the
aggregate labor demand from firms.
The following definition summarizes the description of the equilibrium as well as other
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objects of interests.
Definition 1.1. Fix the fundamentals (u, f,G) and the SDP (τ, F,N). The set of wage,
occupation choice and production decisions {w, e, pi, n} is an equilibrium if it satisfies (1.1),




e (si, w) di, Y =
∫
e (si, w) zif (n (zi, w)) di. (1.4)
The laissez-faire economy is defined as the one with (τ, F ) = (1, 0).
Throughout the paper, I attach LF and SDP to the equilibrium objects whenever the
distinction of the laissez-faire economy and the economy with the SDP needs to be made
explicit.
To ensure that the equilibrium is well-behaved, I make three assumptions on the fun-
damentals (u, f,G). First, utility and production functions (u, f) are strictly increasing,
strictly concave and satisfy the Inada condition. As will be clear, the strict concavity of
the production function ensures the optimal level of firm creation. Second, the joint dis-
tribution of the signal productivity G (s, z) is continuous, has bounded productivity, i.e.
P (0 < zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax <∞) = 1 for some (zmin, zmax), and reflects positively informative
signals, i.e., the conditional distribution G (z|s) first-order stochastically dominates G (z|s′)
whenever s > s′. The continuity allows the system to adjust continuously, the bounded
productivity saves the complexity of infinite utility, and the positively informative signal
provides a normalization so that the higher signal one observes, the more likely one gets
higher productivity. Finally, I assume the signal and productivity (si, zi)i are drawn i.i.d.
from G. The i.i.d. assumption makes it possible to invoke the law of large numbers.
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I call these assumptions (A). Under these assumptions, the existence and the uniqueness
can be guaranteed as stated in the next proposition. I also show the proof since it clarifies
the structure of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose that the fundamentals (u, f,G) satisfy the assumptions (A). An
equilibrium exists and is unique almost surely.
Proof. Given the signal structure, the occupation choice follows a threshold strategy e (si) =
1si≥s¯. The almost surely qualification reflects the indeterminacy of optimal occupation for
the marginal entrepreneur si = s¯. Given the individual occupation choice e (·), the market
equilibrium can be characterized by the equilibrium wage w and the threshold s¯ that satisfy
the following indifference condition and the market clearing condition
E [u (pi (z, w)) |s = s¯] = u (w) , (1.5)
E [n (z, w) 1s≥s¯] = Gs (s¯) . (1.6)
where Eq.(1.3) invokes the law of large numbers a la Uhlig [1996].
To show the existence and the uniqueness, note that, for a fixed SDP (τ, F,N), the
indifference condition (1.5) specifies a positive relationship between the wage w and the
threshold s¯, while the market clearing condition (1.6) provides a negative relationship. Both
of these relationships are continuous since n (z, w) jumps at most at one point. Moreover,
according to the market clearing condition, w →∞ as G (s¯)→ 0, and w → 0 as G (s¯)→ 1.
Therefore, the two loci must cross each other once.





Figure 1.3: Equilibrium system on (w, φ) plane. The indifference condition gives a negative
relationship, while the market clearing condition generates a positive relationship.
relationships between the wage w and the number of firms φ = 1−Gs (s¯). One can graphically
see them in Fig.1.3. First, the indifference condition implies that if the wage increases, more
people find it attractive to become workers, so the number of firms declines. This is the labor
supply side intuition from the individual perspective and generates the negative relationship
between the wage and the number of firms. Second, the market clearing condition implies
that, if the wage increases, firms' labor demand declines, so there will be fewer workers,
ending up with more firms. This labor demand side story gives the positive relationship
between the wage and the number of firms. Since these two forces bring the system to the
opposite directions, there exists a unique equilibrium irrespective of the specific form of the
productivity and the signal structure G.
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1.2.1 Risks and efficiency of the laissez-faire economy
The key to understanding the role of the SDP is the market failure due to entrepreneurial
risks. This section defines the riskiness of entrepreneurship and shows that the laissez-faire
economy without the SDP is inefficient if and only if there are entrepreneurial risks. In
particular, I highlight the insufficient firm creation in the presence of entrepreneurial risks.
The riskiness of entrepreneurship is defined by how informative the signal s is about the
productivity z. If the signal s is very informative about entrepreneurial productivity z, agents
can accurately forecast future profits when they become entrepreneurs. In contrast, if agents
have uninformative signal s, becoming entrepreneurs may involve substantial downside risks.
One way to define informativeness mathematically is to use the information sets. If
the information sets of the two random variables are identical, i.e. the sigma algebras are
identical σs = σz, there are no entrepreneurial risks. In contrast, if the signal is independent
of the productivity σs ⊥ σz, there are full risks. Although this definition has generality, it
does not come with a natural framework to think about the intermediate cases. Thus, the
current section uses a weaker condition to define riskiness.
Definition 1.2. The riskiness of entrepreneurship for those who observe s is defined as
the conditional variance V (z|s) ∈ [0, V (z)]. V (z|s) = 0 corresponds to no risks, while
V (z|s) = V (z) > 0 corresponds to full risks.
One can use weaker conditions, defining no risks as the signal structure where each agent
knows the best occupation for sure, i.e., P (pi (z, w) ≥ w|s) ∈ {1, 0} for all s, and full risks
as the signal structure where the signal is not informative about the occupation choice, i.e.
P (pi (z, w) ≥ w|s) = P (pi (z, w) ≥ w) for all s. This definition allows intuitive intermediate
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cases for some signal structure and is adopted in section 1.4.
In any case, the economy with no risks is characterized by (z¯, w) that satisfies the following
indifference and market clearing conditions
pi (z¯, w) = w, E [n (z, w) 1z≥z¯] = Gz (z¯) , (1.7)
and the economy with full risks is characterized by (w, φ) that satisfies another set of indif-
ference and market clearing conditions
Eu (pi (z, w)) = u (w) , φEn (z, w) = 1− φ. (1.8)
One can see that, without risks, the utility function disappears from the equilibrium system.
With full risks, the equilibrium wage is determined by the indifference condition, and the
number of firms is determined by the market clearing condition. Graphically, the full-risk
case requires the indifference condition in Fig.1.3 to be horizontal for the interior number
of firms. In terms of the literature, the two cases correspond to Lucas [1978] and Kanbur
[1979a], and Garicano et al. [2016] use the former to estimate the efficiency loss due to the
SDP.
Given the riskiness, I can discuss the efficiency of the laissez-faire economy. Once the
market failure of the laissez-faire economy is understood, I describe the mechanism by which
the SDP improves efficiency in section 1.3.
To discuss the efficiency, I define the planner's problem who can choose allocations at
each state but faces the same informational constraints as individual agents. Formally,
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a state of the economy is a collection of the productivity realizations for all agents ω =
{zi}i ∈ Ω = [zmin, zmax][0,1]. The planner chooses the contingency plan of the consump-
tion c = {ci (ω)}i∈[0,1],ω∈Ω, the employment schedule when agents become entrepreneurs
{ni (ω)}i∈[0,1],ω∈Ω and the allocation of occupation e = {e (si)}i. Note that the consumption
and employment are contingent on each state, but the occupation has to be measurable with
respect to the signal s since that is the informational constraint agents face. Such informati-
onal constraint is standard in the literature of efficiency analysis with informational frictions.
(Angeletos and Pavan [2007])




EΩu (ci (ω)) dΛi (1.9)
where EΩ denotes the expectation over the state Ω constructed from Gz.1 Since the eco-
nomy consists of heterogeneous agents differentiated by the observed signal {si}i, I do not
take a stand on the Pareto weight such as utilitarian or Rawlsian, and instead, focus on
the production side. Note that since the economy does not have aggregate uncertainty and
production in one firm is independent of the productivity of other firms, I can restrict the
employment schedule to be measurable with respect to productivity, n = {n (z)}z. Further-
more, since the planner maximizes output, the allocation of occupation is a threshold rule
e (si) = 1si≥s¯ without loss of generality. This is equivalent to choosing the number of firms
φ = 1−Gs (s¯). Hence, the planner's problem can be defined as follows.
Definition 1.3. Fix the fundamentals (u, f,G). A set of consumption, employment schedule,
1The formal construction relies on Kolmogorov extension theorem.
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ci (ω) di = Y
Y = φE [zf (n (z)) |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)] ∀ω ∈ Ω
φ+ φE [n (z) |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)] = 1
(1.10)
for some Pareto weight Λ.
The first constraint requires that individual consumption adds up to the aggregate out-
put. Since the economy does not have aggregate uncertainty, it implies that the planner can
provide full insurance, ci (ω) = c (ω′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. An immediate implication is that the
planner chooses employment schedule n and the number of firms φ to maximize output. The
second constraint illustrates the production technology as a function of (n, φ). There are φ
firms and each of them produces E [zf (n (z)) |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)] on average. The conditional
expectation reflects the entrepreneurs selection s¯ = G−1s (1− φ). The third constraint des-
cribes the human resource constraint. φ agents become entrepreneurs and each of them hire
E [n (z) |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)] workers, which have to add up to the total population 1.
In general, the planner's solution depends on the Pareto weight. The production side,
however, can be uniquely determined independently of the Pareto weight.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that the fundamentals (u, f,G) satisfy the assumptions (A).
Then, there is a unique interior solution φP ∈ (0, 1) to the planner's problem (1.10).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
2Although all variables are functions of states, the assumption of no aggregate uncertainty saves the
notation for production side.
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To understand the planner's trade-off that pins down the interior solution, let Y (φ)
denote the aggregate output as a function of the number of firms, obtained by maximizing
out employment schedule {n (z)}z from the last two constraints of (1.10). To be concrete, let
the production function be Cobb-Douglas f (n) = nα with α ∈ (0, 1). The aggregate output
Y (φ) takes the following form






1−α |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)
])1−α
. (1.11)
One can see the two channels through which the number of entrepreneurs impacts the ag-
gregate output.
The first channel is the average productivity A (φ). It describes a typical concern about
entrepreneurship promotion. If the number of entrepreneurs increases φ ↗, since mar-
ginal entrepreneurs is less productive G−1s (1− φ) ↘, the average productivity declines
A (φ) ↘. However, the average productivity A (φ) is not the main technological trade-off
that pins down the unique interior solution. After all, the average productivity is bounded
A (φ) ∈ [zmin, zmax], and does not even react to the number of firms φ when the signal s is
uninformative about the productivity z.
The second channel is the allocation of occupations φ1−α (1− φ)α. This is the key trade-
off that pins down the unique interior solution. When most agents are workers φ → 0, the
small number of firms employs a large number of workers. Due to the decreasing returns
of scale assumption on the production technology f , the worker's marginal product is low.
In this case, dividing the firm into two and shifting some of the workers to higher marginal
product activities raises the aggregate output. However, such firm creation is not cost-less
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since it requires a decrease in the number of workers engaged in production. In the limit,
if everyone becomes an entrepreneur φ → 1, no workers make production, resulting in 0
aggregate output despite the worker's marginal product being ∞.
This trade-off specified by the second channel is present even if the productivity distri-
bution Gz is degenerate or the signal is not informative s ⊥ z. In these cases, the optimal
number of firms is φP = 1− α. It also differentiates the occupation choice models from the
firm dynamics models following Hopenhayn [1992], in which labor supply is fixed and no
entrepreneurs are needed to create additional firms.
Now we are ready to state the efficiency result. Let φLF and φP be the number of firms
in the laissez-faire economy and the planner's solution. The following proposition states that
entrepreneurial risks create the market failure of insufficient firm creation. Note that the
assumptions on the riskiness G (z|s) affect both the market equilibrium and the planner's
solution.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose that the fundamentals (u, f) satisfy the assumptions (A).
1. If there are no entrepreneurial risks, i.e., V (z|s) = 0 for all s, the laissez-faire economy
is Pareto efficient.
2. If there are entrepreneurial risks, i.e., V (z|s) > 0 for all s, the laissez-faire economy is
not Pareto efficient. In particular, the laissez-faire economy creates insufficient number
of firms φLF < φP .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
The results are not surprising if one notices that the economy without risks has complete
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markets so the analogy of the first welfare theorem holds, while the economy with risks featu-
res incomplete markets and uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. As is standard in the literature
of incomplete markets, the result can be extended to constrained inefficiency as shown in
Appendix A.6.1 and discussed in details in Ando and Matsumura [2017].
The intuition of the results is transparent if one considers a marginal increase of firms and
aggregate output. Without risks, the entrepreneur with productivity z produces pi (z, w) and
workers produce w. If one worker changes the occupation to entrepreneur, the net output
gain is pi (z, w) − w. In the laissez-faire economy (1.7), the marginal entrepreneurs are
indifferent to the workers pi (z¯, w) = w. Therefore, increasing firms results in zero net output
gain pi (z¯, w) − w = 0. With risks, the marginal entrepreneurs produce more than workers
E [pi (z, w) |s = s¯] > w in the laissez-faire economy. This is because for risk-averse agents
to become entrepreneurs, they have to be able to produce and consume more than workers
on average. As a result, switching the marginal workers into entrepreneurs raise aggregate
output by E [pi (z, w) |s = s¯]− w > 0.
1.3 Mechanism
I have shown in the previous section that Pareto improvement is only possible if there are
entrepreneurial risks. This section uses the full-risk model to magnify the role of risks and
describe how the SDP could make Pareto improvement. After describing the mechanism, I
discuss its plausibility.
The key observation is that the SDP may increase the number of firms by (1) preventing





Figure 1.4: Indifference condition and market clearing condition.
through general equilibrium. To see the first channel, note that the SDP imposes regulatory
costs on big firms, so they hire fewer workers. Since agents are either entrepreneurs or
workers, the decline in the number of workers implies the rise in the number of firms increases
in equilibrium. This is a partial equilibrium impact with fixed wage and is illustrated as the
shift of the market clearing condition in Fig.1.4.
In general equilibrium, wage decreases. To see this, note that the SDP makes entre-
preneurship less attractive in partial equilibrium, i.e., piSDP
(
z, wLF
) ≤ piLF (z, wLF ) for all
z ∈ [zmin, zmax]. Since the inequality is strict for big firms, the indifference condition (1.8)
implies that the wage declines wSDP < wLF . Intuitively, since entrepreneurship is less at-
tractive, agents want to become workers. As a result of increase in worker supply, the wage
decreases. This force is illustrated as the shift of the indifference condition in Fig.1.4.3
3When the signal is informative, the lower labor demand from big firms also pushes down the wage.
Mathematically, the indifference condition is not horizontal, so the shift of the market clearing condition
itself causes wage decline.
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The wage decline mitigates the downside risks of entrepreneurship. This is because, from
the ex-ante point of view, even when businesses end up being small or unprofitable, entre-
preneurs do not have to pay the regulatory costs but can enjoy cheaper labor costs. The
mitigation of the downside risks is illustrated in the right figure of Fig.(1.5). In partial equi-
librium, the profit in the laissez-faire economy is higher for all productivity levels. However,
such profit shift makes entrepreneurship less attractive. To regain equilibrium, the wage has
to decline. As a result, the small firms that do not face regulation can hire workers cheaply,
resulting in higher profit.
Both direct regulations on big firms and indirect subsidies to small firms contribute to
firm creation. The former prevents big firms from absorbing potential entrepreneurs, and
the latter reduces the downside risks of entrepreneurship. Thus, the SDP may support firm
creation.
The increase in the number of firms may lead to output increase. The intuition can
be obtained by the perturbation argument. I show the results and relegate the derivation
to Appendix A.2. Suppose the government implements a small value of SDP around the
laissez-faire T = (τ, F ) ≈ (1, 0). The marginal impact on the aggregate output is
∂TY = ∂Tφ (Epi (z, w)− w) . (1.12)
The expression illustrates that the policy impact around the laissez-faire economy is the
multiplication of how many firms the policy increases ∂Tφ and how much additional output
each firm produces Epi (z, w) − w. Intuitively, since entrepreneurs produce Epi (z, w) and









Figure 1.5: Employment schedule n (z, w) and profit pi (z, w) for the laissez-faire economy
and the economy with the SDP. PE denotes partial equilibrium where the wage is fixed at
laissez-faire level wLF . GE means general equilibrium where the wage is wSDP .
Epi (z, w)−w on average. This term is positive since in the laissez-faire economy, risk aversion
requires entrepreneurs to produce and consume more Epi (z, w) − w > 0 in equilibrium for
the compensation of the risk-taking. Therefore, the SDP that increases the number of firms
∂Tφ > 0 increases the aggregate output.4
The increase in output and the reduction of risks may lead to Pareto improvement if the
government returns the tax revenue. Note that, since agents are ex-ante identical in the full-
risk model (1.8), the welfare can be measured by the worker's consumption. As a result, if
the government throws away the tax revenue, all agents are worse off due to the lower wage.
However, if the government has enough tax revenue and return it to agents, the disposable
4The output increase does not happen in no-risk case. To see this, note that the same perturbation
argument leads to
∂TY = −gz (z¯) ∂T z¯ · (pi (z¯, w)− w) . (1.13)
Since pi (z¯, w) = w in laissez-faire economy, the net output gain is ∂TY = 0 even though the SDP increases
the number of firms.
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wage can increase. In this sense, Pareto improvement is possible if the government raises
enough revenue and return it.
Each of the above steps involves non-trivial assumptions and necessitates the quantifica-
tion exercise in section 1.4. First, the increase in the number of firms hinges on the wage not
declining too much. If wage declines to w ≈ 0, firms can hire many workers, so the number
of entrepreneurs decreases. In other words, the general equilibrium impacts on the system
through wage cannot be larger than the partial equilibrium impacts. As is shown in section
1.4, this is true for standard parametric specifications. Second, the output increase is discus-
sed around the laissez-faire economy. This is to illustrate the intuition of the efficiency gain.
For the SDP far from the laissez-faire, there is efficiency loss due to the bunching. Therefore,
whether the output increases or not depends on the balance of the two forces, and has to be
determined numerically. This necessitates the quantification exercise in section 1.4. Third,
the Pareto improvement requires the government to raise enough revenue. Although the
SDP increases output and reduces risks for each entrepreneur, the number of entrepreneurs
also increases. Since the entrepreneurs need to consume more on average to obtain the same
utility as workers, whether the SDP can increase enough output to Pareto improve all agents
is not obvious. Again, the non-triviality necessitates the quantification exercise in section
1.4.
1.3.1 Discussion about the mechanism
The mechanism of welfare improvement relies on debatable assumptions and generates see-
mingly counter-intuitive implications. In this section, I provide a discussion for each of
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them.
First, the logic that workers change occupations to become entrepreneurs might naturally
generate concerns about unemployment. Although the model does not address unemploy-
ment, I make two heuristic observations. First, there are many countries that have both SDPs
and low unemployment rates. Therefore, at least in the long run, SDPs and unemployment
can be considered separate issues. Second, the thought experiment that I am interested in
is the removal of the SDP. Thus, the relevant trade-off is the lower unemployment rate in
the short run and the lower aggregate output in the long run. Therefore, the social cost
associated with unemployment is not an issue in both the long and short run in the current
context.
Second, the output increase depends on entrepreneurs producing more on average Epi (z, w) >
w than workers in the laissez-faire economy. Since many countries adopt SDPs, it is not easy
to empirically test whether Epi (z, w) > w holds in the unobservable laissez-faire economy.
That being said, it is informative to understand the debate about entrepreneurial returns








> wLF . The seminal
papers that claim the inequality Epi (z, w) > w is violated are Hamilton [2000] and Mosko-
witz and Vissing-Jorgensen [2002]. Their studies have generated a literature that tries to
explain why people choose to become entrepreneurs in the first place (e.g. Vereshchagina
and Hopenhayn [2009]).
More recent papers argue against Epi (z, w) > w. Levine and Rubinstein [2017] argue
that the definition of entreprneeurs used in the literature many not be appropriate. If en-
trepreneurs are defined to be incorporated self-employed, the mean return is much higher
than salaried workers. Manso [2016] points out that the estimations in the literature might
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be biased due to the usage of cross-sectional data to compute the mean of entrepreneurial
earnings. Manso [2016] reports that, once the option value of experimentation is incorpo-
rated, the mean lifetime earnings of entrepreneurs are higher than those of salary workers
in the U.S. Given that there might be many other factors that affect the returns on the
two occupations, I explore the implications of the standard occupation choice model in this
paper.
Third, some might feel the mechanism is counter-intuitive because output increases even
though big firms hire fewer workers under the SDP. One way to understand the logic intui-
tively is to consider an extreme example. Suppose one company hires the entire population.
Even if the firm is productive, this is not necessarily a good thing if it has decreasing returns
to scale. This is because eventually, the marginal product of employees declines. What the
SDP does is reduce the firm's employees and facilitate their engagement in firm creation.
Since the workers in the new firms have higher marginal products, an increase in the number
of firms is an improvement in production efficiency. I discuss when this intuition breaks in
section 1.6.
Finally, the Pareto improvement is based on tax return. Since many SDPs are non-
pecuniary such as working hours regulations, there might not be tax revenue in reality. In
this case, the fair comparison is (1) the economy with SDP and (2) the laissez-faire economy
with the same amount of non-distortionary regulation costs. In Appendix A.3, I take the
extreme by assuming the SDP (τ, F ) is completely non-pecuniary, and show that the economy
with the SDP (1) still generates higher welfare than the counterfactual (2).
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1.4 Quantification
This section quantifies the welfare impact of removing the SDP. The main result is that
removing the SDP leads to lower output and welfare. The result of output decline is the
opposite to the previous literature and highlights the potential importance of the channel
described in section 1.3.
To isolate the role of entrepreneurial risks, I closely follow the setup of Garicano et al.
[2016]. In particular, I impose the parametric assumptions on the fundamentals, with utility
and production functions being constant relative risk aversion and Cobb-Douglas
u (c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ , γ > 0, f (n) = n
α, α ∈ (0, 1) (1.14)




z−βz , zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax. (1.15)
This productivity distribution leads to a broken power law of the firm size distribution as
detailed in Appendix A.4.
I focus on the full risks model, (1.8), and relegate a specific intermediate signal case in
Appendix A.5. In this way, the quantitative exercise in this section is the exact opposite
polar case of Garicano et al. [2016] with the same set of fundamentals. Therefore, one can
transparently see the implications of the entrepreneurial risks without being affected by the
specific choice of the signal structure.
Formally, the factual economy with the SDP (τ, F,N) and the non-distortionary income
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that satisfies the indifference condition
Eu ((1− t)pi (z, w)) = u ((1− t)w) , (1.16)
profit maximization (1.1), and the market clearing condition in (1.8). The income tax t
is non-distortionary because, when the utility function is CRRA, (1− t) drops out of the
equilibrium system as is clear from (1.16). As a result, all the equilibrium objects except for
welfare are independent of the income tax rate t. To determine the welfare, I set the income
tax rate t = t (τ, F ) by imposing the balanced budget constraint
φSDPE
[{









1− φSDP )wSDP} = 0. (1.17)
I compare the factual economy with the counterfactual laissez-faire economy where (t, τ, F ) =
(0, 1, 0). Specifically, I compare aggregate output, welfare, number of firms, and wage in the
two economies. Note that the welfare is given by the disposable income (1− t)wSDP and
wLF .
There are two differences from Garicano et al. [2016]. The first is the existence of entre-
preneurial risks, and the second is the welfare criterion. The welfare criterion of Garicano
et al. [2016] is aggregate output minus tax revenue. To make the comparison consistent, I
also report output minus tax revenue in section 1.4.2. An alternative welfare specification
assuming all the SDP being non-pecuniary is available in Appendix A.3. Irrespective of
the specification of the welfare criterion, all other equilibrium objects (Y,w, φ) are directly
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parameter value explanation
γ 2 CRRA parameter
α .8 Cobb-Douglas parameter
τ 1.023 marginal tax
F/w −.941 normalized fixed tax
βz 5 power law parameter of Gz
zmax 8.07 productivity upper bound
zmin 1.4 productivity lower bound
Table 1.1: Parameter values for counterfactual analysis. All parameters are taken from
Garicano et al. [2016] except for (γ, zmin). Wage w is not identified so is normalized to
w = 1 without loss of generality.
comparable.
1.4.1 Parameter values
To conduct the counterfactual analysis, I need to specify the value of the parameters. In this
section, I show the parameter values and describe the steps. The main takeaway is that I
can use the same parameter values as Garicano et al. [2016], and therefore all the differences
in the results are driven by the existence of entrepreneurial risks, not other elements such as
the data used and specifications of the model.
Table 1.1 summarizes the choice of the parameter values based on the same French
data used by Garicano et al. [2016]. Note that the fixed tax F is negative. This does
not mean the firms at size N get subsidies since the variable tax τ applies to all workers,
not just the net additional workers n − N . Indeed, the tax payment for firms at N is
(τ − 1)wN + F = .186w > 0.
The main parameters of interest is the SDP (τ, F,N). The threshold N is determined
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by the law so there is no other choice than N = 49. The variable and fixed components
(τ, F ), as pioneered by Garicano et al. [2016], can be estimated jointly with the power law
parameter βz by using the data of firm size distribution. To be more concrete, one can derive
the equilibrium firm size distribution n 7→ Gn (n; τ, F, βz) that follows a broken power law
as detailed in Appendix A.4, and use the maximum likelihood method to fit it to the firm
size distribution data {ni}i by choosing (τ, F, βz) and other auxiliary parameters. As a trick
to cleanly estimate the parameters, Garicano et al. [2016] truncate the data and likelihood
function (n ≤ 10 and n ≥ 10, 000) so that the two tails do not impact the estimation.
In principle, since I use a different model with entrepreneurial risks, I need to recollect the
same data and redo the same estimation. However, I can use the same estimates as Garicano
et al. [2016] because the implied firm size distributions after truncation are identical. To see
this, recall that the two models, (1.7) and (1.8) share the same fundamentals (u, f,Gz) . The
only implication of the entrepreneurial risks on the firm size distribution Gn (n) is whether
low productivity agents become entrepreneurs or not. With no risks, only high productivity
agents {i : pi (zi, w) ≥ w} become entrepreneurs, while with full risks, all productivity levels
are possible. However, the firm size distributions Gn (n) in the two models are both broken
power laws. Since the broken power law is invariant to truncation, the firm size distributions
after truncation are identical, and therefore generate the same estimates.5
Other parameters follow the calibration and normalization of Garicano et al. [2016]. For
instance, the equilibrium wage is unidentified, so is normalized to be 1. The parameter that
is not in Garicano et al. [2016] is the risk aversion γ. I choose the standard number γ = 2 and
5The likelihood function in Garicano et al. [2016] also incorporates measurement error. Although this
complication might potentially create discrepancies between the estimates, I show they are numerically
negligible in Appendix A.4 using Amadeus data and the models with and without entrepreneurial risks.
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Equilibrium objects Full risks No risks Concepts
lnY LF − lnY SDP −1.5% .02% output
lnφLF − lnφSDP −8% −7.2% number of firms
lnY LF − ln (Y SDP − tax) −.3% 1.3% output - tax
lnwLF − ln{(1− t)wSDP} −1.25% NA welfare
lnwLF − lnwSDP .002% 1.8% wage
Table 1.2: Results of the counterfactual analysis. The column Full risks is the result of
the counterfactual analysis using full-risk model. The one with No risks is the result of
Garicano et al. [2016]. Welfare in the model without risks is NA because the model is
heterogeneous-agent, so the welfare depends on the Pareto weight.
discuss the robustness of the results to it in section 1.4.2. Other parameters (α, zmin, zmax)
also follow Garicano et al. [2016]. For the details, see Appendix A.4.
1.4.2 Results
This section presents the results of the counterfactual analysis. It is shown that the output is
1.5% lower and the welfare in wage-unit is 1.27% lower in the laissez-faire economy without
the SDP.
The results are summarized in table 1.2. The first column shows the results of the
counterfactual analysis based on my model with full entrepreneurial risks. The second column
is a copy from Garicano et al. [2016], which is based on the model with no entrepreneurial
risks.
The first row shows that the factual economy has the higher output than the counterfac-
tual economy. This might be surprising if one just sees the marginal products. Specifically,
the marginal products equalize among all firms in the laissez-faire economy, yet the laissez-
faire economy produces less than the factual economy with wedges across firms. Fig.1.6
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate output Y (φ). Points A, B, and C are the counterfactual allocation
without the SDP, the factual with the SDP and the efficient allocation.
describes the intuition behind the result. The red line represents the production possibility
frontier of the economy with the SDP Y SDP (φ) as a function of the number of firms φ. For
each fixed number of firms, the removal of the SDP improves production efficiency so the
production possibility frontier of the laissez-faire economy is located above. Therefore, for
a given number of firms, removing SDP does improve resource allocation. However, remo-
ving the SDP exacerbates the market failure of firm creation. In particular, as discussed
in section 1.3, big firms suck up human resources from entrepreneurial activities and the
entrepreneurship itself is riskier. As a result, the number firms declines as shown in the
second row. The counterfactual analysis shows that the efficiency loss of firm creation can
be larger than efficiency gain from marginal product equalization.6
The third row of table 1.2 highlights the implication of the entrepreneurial risks in a
6This does not happen in Garicano et al. [2016] because the laissez-faire economy is at the top of the
production possibility frontier. Therefore, no matter how the number of firms changes, the aggregate output
necessarily declines.
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stronger sense. This is the welfare criterion of Garicano et al. [2016]. The result shows that,
even if the laissez-faire economy is given the tax advantage, the economy with the SDP still
produces more. In this sense, my result is the opposite of Garicano et al. [2016].
The fourth row of table 1.2 shows that the welfare is also higher with the SDP. As
discussed in 1.3, the result implies that the SDP increases the aggregate output by non-
trivial amount. Quantitatively, the tax revenue
T = φSDPE [{(τ − 1)wSDPn (z, wSDP ; τ, F)+ F} 1n(z,wSDP ;τ,F )>N] (1.18)
amounts to 1.14% of aggregate output in the current setting. The result highlights the first
order importance of the channel highlighted in this paper.
The fifth row confirms the decline in wage. As discussed in 1.3, this is an implication of
the specific form of the SDP (τ, F ). I show in 1.5 that, if the SDP is allowed to be any non-
linear function n 7→ T (n), wage can actually increase. Therefore, even if the government
throws away the tax revenue, the SDP can achieve Pareto improvement. In this sense,
wSDP < wLF is not necessarily a robust result.
Finally, I discuss these results are robust to the change in the risk aversion parameter γ.
In fact, the break-even point for the output Y SDP = Y LF and welfare (1− t)wSDP = wLF
is γ = .01. The small risk aversion is not surprising if one notes that the output gain from
removing the SDP in the model with no entrepreneurial risks is only .02%. Similarly, the
break-even point for Y SDP − tax = Y LF is γ = .7, still way below the standard parameter
value γ = 2.
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1.5 Optimal SDP
The analysis so far has described that an economy with the threshold type SDP (τ, F ) can
be better. In other words, an economy with wedges among firms' marginal products can lead
to a better outcome than the one with equal marginal product. A natural question is what
are the optimal wedges implied by SDPs? To answer this question, I study the optimal
non-linear SDP. I also argue that the observed threshold type SDP (τ, F ) shares qualitative
features with the optimal SDP.
The optimal SDP is defined as the solution of an optimal taxation problem. Let n 7→ T (n)
be the tax imposed on the firms that hire n workers. The government is benevolent and
maximizes the welfare
U = φEu (pi (z, w)) + (1− φ)u (w) . (1.19)
Although the expression is the same as utilitarian welfare, any Pareto weight leads to the
same welfare function, since the full-risk case leads to a homogeneous agents model.
The government faces the market equilibrium constraints and the budget constraint.
The market equilibrium constraints consist of the two equations (1.8) and the firm's profit
maximization problem
[pi (z, n) , n (z, w)] = max
n≥0
zf (n)− wn− T (n) . (1.20)
Note that the threshold SDP (τ, F ) is a special case where T (n) = {(τ − 1)wn+ F} 1n>N .
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The budget constraint takes the following form
φET (n (z, w)) = T (1.21)
where T ≥ 0 is exogenously given. There are two reasons for which I do not use the balanced
budget constraint. First, by taking the same amount of resources T as the quantification
exercise in section 1.4, I can make a fair comparison between the estimated SDP and the
optimal SDP. Second, if T = 0 is imposed, some firms have to be mechanically subsidized,
T (n) < 0 for some n. By relaxing the constraint T > 0, I can see whether the government
willingly subsidizes some firms.
Formally, the optimal taxation problem can be formulated as follows.
Definition 1.4. Given the budget T ≥ 0, the government chooses (w, φ, pi, n, T ) to maxi-
mizes wage w subject to (1.8), (1.20), and (1.21).
The optimal SDP problem has a similar structure as Mirrlees [1971] except that it has
general equilibrium wage. I reformulate it as a mechanism design problem and solve the
problem within the set of differentiable functions.







Eu (pi (z))− u (w) = 0
pi′ (z) = f (n (z))
n′ (z) ≥ 0
E [zf (n (z))− wn (z)− pi (z)]− T (1 + En (z)) = 0
. (1.22)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
The first constraint is the indifference condition. The second is the envelope condition of
the truth-telling constraint, and the third is the monotonicity constraint that corresponds
to the second order condition. The last constraint is the government budget constraint.
I can obtain some analytical results about the optimal SDP shared by the observed
threshold type SDP. Let (wo, φo, no, pio, T o) be the solution to the optimal SDP problem.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose that the fundamentals (u, f,Gz) satisfy the assumptions (A),
there are risks V (z) > 0, and the solution does not have bunching
d
dz
no (z) > 0, ∀z ∈ (zmin, zmax) .
Then, the optimal SDP distorts medium-sized firms, i.e., for all z ∈ (zmin, zmax),
wo = zminf
′ (no (zmin)) = zmaxf ′ (no (zmax)) < zf ′ (no (z)) .

























Figure 1.7: Marginal product as the measure of distortion and the optimal SDP as the
percentage of the before-tax profit. The wage in the economy with the estimated threshold
SDP is normalized to be wSDP = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
As discussed in section 1.3, the threshold type SDP increases the number of firms. Mo-
reover, as Fig.1.5 suggests, the bunching firms are most distorted in the sense that their
marginal products are higher than other firms.
To see this point more clearly, I show the numerical solutions in Fig.1.7. The numerical
solution is based on the same parameterization as section 1.4, i.e., (1.14) and (1.15), the same
parameter values as in table 1.1, and the same tax revenue T as (1.18). One can see that the
marginal products are highest in the middle for the threshold type SDP. In particular, the
firms that are indifferent between choosing n = N and n > N are most distorted downward.
One thing that can be seen from the left panel is that the wage is higher under the
optimal SDP than the threshold SDP by more than 30%. Therefore, table 1.2 implies that
the wage level under the SDP is higher than the laissez-faire economy. This is because the
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optimal SDP subsidizes small firms as shown in the right figure, and therefore the welfare is









< Eu (pio (z)) = u (wo) .
In reality, there are various subsidies available for small firms, so it is not appropriate to
say the SDP in reality is not optimal. In fact, the result wSDP < wLF < wo comes from
the parsimonious modeling of the SDP (τ, F ) that abstract from small firms subsidies. In
this paper, I have followed exactly the same formulation as Garicano et al. [2016], but the
result can change once the SDP incorporates subsidies for small firms. In this sense, one can
actually interpret the quantification exercise in section 1.4 as a strong result saying that,
even when the SDP does not subsidize small firms, it could enhance efficiency.
Another thing that can be seen from the left panel of Fig.1.7 is that the optimal SDP
increases the number of firms. This is because higher marginal product implies lower em-
ployment, which then implies more entrepreneurs in equilibrium. This point can be seen
more directly in the left panel of Fig.1.8. One can see that firms with every level of producti-
vity hire fewer workers under the optimal SDP. Similarly, the right panel shows that firms
with every level of productivity make lower before-tax profits under the SDP. However, the
ex-ante welfare is higher since the optimal SDP insures the bad states of low productivity.
In summary, the main lesson from the study of the optimal SDP is that the wedge among
marginal products does not necessarily call for policy intervention to remove the root causes.
Rather, it might be better to distort the firm's production so that the economy features more






















Figure 1.8: Employment and profit schedule under the estimated threshold SDP, optimal
SDP and laissez-faire economy.
1.6 Financial frictions
The analysis so far has shown that the insufficient firm creation due to entrepreneurial risks
might justify SDPs. A natural question is whether this is always the case. I argue the answer
is negative by showing that, under severe financial frictions, removing SDPs might improve
efficiency. As a policy implication, whether to remove SDPs depends on the level of financial
development.
There are three cases where SDPs should be removed. The first case is when entrepre-
neurial risks are not important. If individual agents obtain a precise signal si about their
entrepreneurial productivity zi, SDPs are harmful as shown by Garicano et al. [2016] and
Gourio and Roys [2014]. The second case is when SDPs are so radical that the efficiency loss
dominates the gain from more efficient firm creation. In French data, this is not the case,
but data from other countries might find a large estimate of SDP (τ, F ). Both of these cases
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Figure 1.9: Aggregate output Y (φ) when market generates too many firms. Points A, B,
and C are the market equilibrium without SDPs, the market equilibrium with SDPs and the
unconstrained efficient allocation.
rely on the idea that SDPs should be removed if the cost is larger than the benefit.
The third case is when there are too many firms in the laissez-faire economy. This case
is different from the previous two because removing SDPs has no cost. Fig.1.9 illustrates
this situation. The SDPs that increase the number of firms not only distort production by
creating wedges among firms but also worsen the market failure of firm creation by adding
more firms to the economy with already excessive firms. Thus, removing SDPs enhances
efficiency through two channels.
1.6.1 Financial frictions
One situation that leads to excessive firm creation is severe financial frictions that prevent
firms from expanding their employment to their profit-maximizing sizes. I show formally
that, under severe financial frictions, the laissez-faire economy creates more firms than the
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Pareto efficient level.
To illustrate this point parsimoniously, I introduce a simple form of financial friction to
the firm's profit maximization problem as follows.
pi (z, w) = max
n
zf (n)− wn s.t. wn ≤ λzf (n) (1.23)
where λ−1 > 0 represents the severity of the financial friction. If the financial frictions are
not severe λ > α, the constraint does not bind. Yet as the financial constraint becomes
severer, i.e., λ gets close to 0, the constraint becomes more binding. Such form of financial
constraint has been used in the literature. A recent example includes Bigio and LaO [2016].
One way to micro-found the constraint is limited enforcement. Each entrepreneur owes
the workers their salaries. However, due to the limited enforcement, the entrepreneur can
divert 1− λ fraction of the sales and run without paying the salaries. In this case, workers
are not willing to work for the firm if their salaries exceed λ percent of the sales. One can
also attribute λ to institutional immaturity or other non-financial obstacles. After all, the
formulation is a reduced-form, so I call it financial friction for simplicity.





be the equilibrium in the laissez-faire economy characterized by
(1.8) and (1.23), φP be the planner's solution that solves (1.10) with uninformative signal
s ⊥ z. The following proposition states that under severe financial friction λ ≈ 0, the
laissez-faire economy generates too many firms, so that the SDPs that increase the number
of firms exacerbate human resource misallocation.
Proposition 1.6. Fix CRRA utility, CD production function (u, f) and arbitrary risk dis-
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tribution Gz with bounded support. Under the severe financial friction, i.e., for small λ ≥ 0,
the laissez-faire economy generates excessive number of firms
φP < φLF ≤ 1 = lim
λ→0
φLF .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.5.
The proposition imposes particular functional form assumptions for analytical cleanliness,
but they can be relaxed at the cost of heavier notations. The inefficiency result can be
strengthened to constrained inefficiency. As is the case for proposition 1.3, I relegate the
result to Appendix A.1.5.
To understand the intuition behind the result, recall that the planner is free from financial
frictions. As a result, the efficient allocation is invariant to the severity of financial frictions
λ. Therefore, the inefficiency follows if the number of firms in market equilibrium can get
arbitrarily close to 1. The intuition of severer financial frictions leading to more firms in the
market equilibrium comes from the firm side. If the financial frictions are severe λ→ 0, due
to the cash shortage or limited enforcement, firms cannot expand their employment. In the
extreme case λ = 0, no firm can hire workers. Since the labor demand from firms is limited,
those who are not employed have to do their own businesses, leading to an increase in the
equilibrium number of firms φ→ 1. Thus, under severe financial friction λ ≈ 0, the number
of firms in the laissez-faire economy φLF exceeds that of the efficient allocation φP .
The analysis of the financial friction implies that whether SDPs should be removed or
not depends on the level of financial development. For instance, in developing countries with
immature financial infrastructure, SDPs should be removed and resources should be devoted
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to relaxing financial frictions, even if firm creation is risky.
This implication might be surprising if one considers that entrepreneurial risks and fi-
nancial frictions are often cited as two big obstacles to entrepreneurship. In fact, proposition
1.3 and 1.6 suggests that the two frictions cause market failure in the opposite directions,
i.e., entrepreneurial risks cause the market to create too few firms while financial frictions
cause too many. There are two ways to reconcile the conventional wisdom and my result.
The first one is about the modeling. If one models the financial friction as the fixed
cost necessary to start a firm, it does suppress firm creation. However, as Quadrini [2008]
discusses, people can lower the fixed cost by choosing to start small. In this sense, the
bigger financial friction that entrepreneurs face is the funds to expand, which is exactly
what Eq.(1.23) is meant to capture.
The second way is to recognize that the conventional wisdom is based on partial equili-
brium, and is not suitable to understand the impact of the financial frictions on the general
equilibrium. In partial equilibrium, financial friction reduces profit so people do not want to
become entrepreneurs. In general equilibrium, however, since firms cannot expand employ-
ment due to the financial friction, those unemployed have to do business themselves. The
wage declines to the level consistent with such scenario, rationalizing the existence of many
more small firms.
The positive correlation between the severity of financial frictions and firm creation is
actually consistent with data. Fig.1.10 plots entrepreneurship activity against the severity
of financial frictions. The entrepreneurship is measured by the percentage of the 18 − 65
population who is either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business, taken
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Figure 1.10: Entrepreneurship is positively correlated with financial frictions. x axis repre-
sents the collateral value required for 100 unit of loans. y axis represents the percentage of
the 18 − 65 population who is an either nascent entrepreneur or owner-managers of a new
business. The plot pools all available countries and years 2001−2016. Sources: World Bank,
Enterprise Survey. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
measured by the value of collateral needed for 100 unit of loans, taken from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey.
One can see that more severe financial frictions are associated with higher entrepreneurial
activities. Fig.1.11 presents another data consistent with the analysis. It is based on sur-
vey data, asking country experts whether a country has enough entrepreneurship financing.
Although the data are subjective, it contains more samples. One can see more availability
of financing is associated with lower entrepreneurial activities.
What these figures do not show is the efficiency of the market equilibrium. In other
words, they suggest financial frictions are associated with more firm creation, but do not
provide information whether the increase is too much or not. In this sense, proposition 1.6
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Figure 1.11: Entrepreneurship is negatively correlated with the availability of financing. x
axis is the survey responses about the availability of financial resources - equity and debt -
for SMEs including grants and subsidies. y axis is the percentage of the 18− 65 population
who is an either nascent entrepreneur or owner-managers of a new business. Country year
pooled data. Sources: World Bank, Enterprise Survey. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
As a caveat, financial frictions are not the entire picture. As one can see from Fig.1.11,
there is a difference between high- and low-income countries unexplained by the financial
frictions. Indeed, as Gollin [2008], Seshadri and Roys [2014], Poschke [2017] discuss, various
explanations can be consistent with the negative correlation between GDP per capita and
entrepreneurship. That being said, since the financial friction λ in section 1.6.1 is a reduced
form formulation, it can also be interpreted as anything that prevents firm's expansion. In
this sense, the unexplained variation does not necessarily limit the scope of the insights.
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1.7 Capital accumulation
So far, I have developed analyses in static environments. In this section, I extend the
analysis to a tractable dynamic environment with inter-temporal optimization. It is shown
that risks justify SDPs even when all agents are risk-neutral. Thus, capital accumulation
and consumption smoothing motive further justify SDPs.
To study the implication of inter-temporal trade-off in a parsimonious and tractable
dynamic model, I extend the laissez-faire economy by introducing capital accumulation a
la Krebs [2003] and Kreps-Porteus-Epstein-Zin preference. (Epstein and Zin [1989], Kreps
and Porteus [1978]) The all-purpose good a la Krebs [2003] gives dynamic tractability by
invoking a similar capital accumulation structure as Brock and Mirman [1972]. The Kreps-
Porteus-Epstein-Zin preference isolates the inter-temporal preference from risk aversion so
that I can highlight the implications specific to dynamic environments.
1.7.1 Equilibrium
This section defines the equilibrium of the laissez-faire economy in a tractable dynamic
environment. I derive the closed-form solution of the equilibrium objects and discuss the
similarity to the static model.
The setup of the dynamic economy is a direct extension of the static laissez-faire economy.
There is a continuum of agents facing risky occupational choice and dynamic consumption
maximization problem. The economy has no aggregate uncertainty.
At the beginning of each period, each agent i ∈ [0, 1] is characterized by the (ait−1, jit−1, zit)
consisting of asset ait−1 > 0, occupation jit−1 ∈ {E,W} where E denotes entrepreneurs and
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W workers, and productivity zit > 0. The distribution of the state at t is denoted by
St (ait−1, jit−1, zit) and the initial distribution S0 is exogenously given.
I make three comments about the state. First, the asset ait is an all-purpose good
because it can be used as a consumption good, physical capital and human capital. Second,
for simplicity I assume the productivity {zit}i,t is i.i.d. over i and t, distributed according
to Gz. I assume i.i.d. structure for the simplicity, but it is straightforward to extend it to
persistent process that corresponds to the model with the intermediate signal in the static
environments. Third, the convention of the time subscript is based on the measurability. In
other words, the asset and the occupation are pre-determined at t− 1 before observing the
productivity zit. Therefore, in principle, both the saving and occupation decisions involve
risk takings. However, as will be discussed later, the log inter-temporal preference makes
sure the only decision affected by entrepreneurial risks is the occupation choice.
Within each period t, agents work first, and then make consumption/saving and occu-
pation decisions. For the working part, each agent transforms the all-purpose asset ait−1
into productive capital fI (ait−1) to earn income. Each entrepreneur i ∈ Et uses the capital
kit−1 = fI (ait−1) to run her firm of productivity zit. In particular, given wage wt, the entre-
preneur i solves the profit-maximization problem to obtain piit = pi (zit, wt, kit−1) by hiring
nit = n (zit, wt, kit−1) employees
[pi (z, w, k) , n (z, w, k)] = max
n≥0
zf (k, n)− wn. (1.24)
Each worker i ∈ Wt sells his human capital hit−1 = fI (ait−1) to earn labor income wthit−1.
After obtaining income, each agent i makes consumption-saving decision and chooses
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whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker next period. The consumption-saving deci-
sion (cit, ait) has to be chosen from the budget set
Bt (a,E, z) = {(c, a′) : k = fI (a) , c+ a′ = pi (z, wt, k)}
Bt (a,W, z) = {(c, a′) : h = fI (a) , c+ a′ = wth} . (1.25)
The occupation choice allows mixed strategy eit ∈ [0, 1] as in the static case, i.e., if an agent
chooses eit, she becomes an entrepreneur jit = E with probability eit. Each agent i chooses










where u and uI are intra- and inter-termporal utility functions, and the expectation E is
taken with respect to both productivity zit > 0 and the mixed strategy eit ∈ [0, 1].
Finally, the labor market has to clear, i.e., labor demand from entrepreneurs equal to





The following definition summarizes the equilibrium concepts.
Definition 1.5. Fix the fundamentals E = (β, u, uI , f, fI , Gz, S0). The set of individual choi-
ces and wage {Vit, ait, cit, eit, hit, kit, piit, nit, wt}i,t constitutes an equilibrium if the following
conditions are satisfied for all t ≥ 0.
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1. At each t, given wt, the profit and the employment decision {piit, nit} by the entrepre-
neur with productivity zit solves the profit maximization problem (1.24).
2. Given {wt}t, the value and policies {Vit, ait, cit, eit}i,t maximize individual welfare (1.26)
subject to (cit, ait, eit) ∈ Bt (ait−1, jit−1, zit)× [0, 1].
3. At each period t, labor market clears (1.27).




This is a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets, so in general, a closed form solution is not available. However, the following para-
meterizations allow us to study the efficiency of firm creation analytically
u (c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ , uI (c) = ln c, f (k, n) = k
1−αnα, fI (a) = aθ (1.28)
where γ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1). The intra-temporal utility u remains the same as the
static model. The logarithmic inter-temporal utility uI separates the saving decision from
the uncertainty about the productivity zit. This is because the optimal saving is a constant
fraction of the income and is independent of the potentially risky returns to saving. In this
way, I can make sure the only risky decision is occupation choice, so that the result is directly
comparable with the static environment. The production function is the standard Cobb-
Douglas form with complementarity between the entrepreneurial capital and the workers'
human capital. As a result, the profit becomes a linear function of entrepreneurial capital
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pi (z, w, k) = r (z, w) k, and therefore can be interpreted as the return to entrepreneurial
capital. The investment function features decreasing returns to scale, which ensures that
there is a stationary asset distribution.









αα (1− α)1−α ,
φLFt =
1− α








One can see that the risk aversion 1 − γ is always multiplied by 1−β
1−βθ > 1. This additional
term comes from the inter-temporal decision and makes the agents effectively more risk-
averse. In fact, even when agents are risk-neutral γ = 0, the number of firms φLFt is smaller
than 1 − α, the efficient number of firms in the static environment. As shown in the next
section 1.7.2, 1− α is also the efficient number of firms in the dynamic environment.
1.7.2 Efficiency analysis
This section presents the efficiency analysis of the dynamic model. The direction of the
market failure remains the same as in the static economy but the severity is greater due to
the consumption-smoothing motive. A novel insight is that the market failure is more severe
in an economy with more patient agents.






facing the same technology and information constraints as the indi-
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vidual agent. Specifically, given the Pareto weight function i 7→ Λi, the planner maximizes
the welfare
∫
Vit (ω) dΛi where Vit (ω) satisfies











and the expectation EΩt+1|Ωt is taken over the subset of state space Ωt+1 accessible from ωt.
In the following, I omit the notation of the state ω and related measure theoretic treatment,
since the problem reduces to the aggregate production maximization in a economy with no
aggregate uncertainty.
The planner's decision can be described recursively. At each period t, the planner takes as
given the set of entrepreneurs Et−1 ⊂ [0, 1] and workers Wt−1 = [0, 1] \Et−1 chosen at period
t − 1, and their saving for capital, {ait−1}i. The capital generates entrepreneurial capital
kit−1 = fI (ait−1) if stored by an entrepreneur i ∈ Et−1 and human capital hit−1 = fI (ait−1)












After the production, the planner chooses the occupation Et,Wt for period t+ 1 and divides




aitdi = Yt. (1.32)
The key informational assumption is that when the planner chooses the asset ait, the pro-
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ductivity tomorrow zit+1 is not observable
ait ⊥ zit+1. (1.33)
In summary, the efficient allocation can be defined as follows.
Definition 1.6. Fix the fundamentals E . The set of individual values, consumption-saving,
occupation, and production decisions and the aggregate output {Vit, cit, ait, Et,Wt, kit, hit, nit, Yt}
is efficient if it maximizes (1.30) subject to (1.32), (1.33) and (1.31). The number of firms





It is immediate to see that the efficient allocation maximizes the aggregate output Yt at
each period given the asset {ait−1}. Since the planner can control all the allocations, as in
the static case, the planner's problem can be separated into production and allocation of
consumption.
The following proposition states that the direction of the market failure remains the same
as the static case, but the market failure gets worse due to the inter-temporal consumption
smoothing motive.
Proposition 1.7. The laissez-faire economy generates an insufficient number of firms if and
only if there are entrepreneurial risks.
φLFt < φ
P
t = 1− α⇔ V (z) > 0.
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This is true even when all agents are risk neutral γ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.6.
The inefficiency result can be extended to constrained inefficiency as discussed in Ap-
pendix A.6.3. I make two observations about the statement. First, note that the planner's
solution φPt = 1− α is identical to the static model, making the static and dynamic models
directly comparable. Second, the last line presents a new insight specific to the dynamic en-
vironment. It states that the market failure happens even when all agents are risks-neutral.
This is not the case in the static environment. If agents are risk-neutral, both the laissez-
faire and planner choose φ = 1 − α in the static environment, making Pareto improvement
impossible.
The intuition is based on the consumption-smoothing motive. Since agents want to
smooth consumption, they want to avoid asset fluctuation. To avoid the asset fluctuation,
one can choose the salary job with a safer return. Therefore, the number of firms is smaller
than the efficient level.
The key observation is that consumption-smoothing motive works similarly as risk aver-
sion. This is not surprising if one realizes that the intra-temporal and inter-temporal prefe-
rences both discount the value of fluctuations across a set of states. Mathematically, they
both represent the force of Jensen's inequality over the states called in different ways.
However, the observation does provide a non-trivial insight about the patience β. As can
be seen from Eq.(1.29), the more patient agents are β ↗, the severe the market failure is
φP − φLF ↗. This is because patient agents care more about the fluctuation of the future
consumption. In other words, higher patience magnifies consumption-smoothing motive.
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Therefore, in high patience economy, removal of SDPs can cause severe human resource
misallocation.
1.8 Conclusion
I have shown that SDPs might enhance efficiency in the presence of entrepreneurial risks.
The analysis not only changes the conventional wisdom about SDPs, but also casts a caveat
in general to the misallocation measurement exercises based on marginal product equaliza-
tion. I have also made the analysis comprehensive by showing that severe financial frictions
can cause excessive firm creation even if firm creation is risky. This result implies that
developing countries with severe financial frictions should remove SDPs. Finally, I have ana-
lyzed the implications of dynamic decisions. The analysis not only confirms the robustness
of the findings in the static environment but also provides a novel insight into the role of
consumption-smoothing motive and patience. These analyses deepen our understanding of
SDPs.
I conclude the paper by mentioning three caveats to my analyses. First, there can be
many other justifications for SDPs. For instance, small firms might have some externality
in R&D and employment. However, these arguments are highly controversial compared
to entrepreneurial risks (Biggs [2003], Shane [2008, 2009]). Another justification for SDPs
is that it saves the government administrative costs as discussed in Kaplow [2017]. My
analysis should be considered a complement to these discussions. Second, I have assumed
that individual agent maximizes profit, but the importance of non-pecuniary benefit has
also been pointed in the entrepreneurship literature (Hurst and Pugsley [2011], Gordon and
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Sarada [2017]). Exploring the implications of behavioral agents that have other objectives
than profit maximization is an interesting future topic. Third, I have focused on SDPs
that treat small firms preferentially. However, some countries treat large firms preferentially
to foster international competitiveness. In this case, SDPs are adopted based on a totally
different logic and therefore their analysis needs a different framework. These points are
missing in the analysis and should be explored in future research.
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Chapter 2
Constrained Efficiency of Competitive
Entrepreneurship
Sakai Ando and Misaki Matsumura
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2.1 Introduction
It is well known that incomplete markets are generically constrained inefficient (Diamond
[1967], Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986], Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986], Geanakoplos
et al. [1990]). When the incompleteness comes from uninsurable risks, the constrained plan-
ner is known to improve welfare by providing insurance through changing equilibrium prices.
Despite the established mathematical argument and its generality, however, few examples
are available that are so simple that one can grasp the economic intuition of why incomplete
markets create room for the constrained planner's intervention. Since constrained inefficiency
in incomplete markets is not just of theoretical interest but often is used as the justification
for policy intervention, an example in which one can follow the precise logic without relying
on mathematical derivation is valuable.
In this paper, we use the competitive entrepreneurship model, a descendant of Kanbur
[1979b], to illustrate the economic intuition of why the competitive equilibrium leaves room
for intervention by the constrained planner. The key feature of the competitive entrepre-
neurship model is the simple structure of the equilibrium price determination. Specifically,
the equilibrium price makes sure the certainty equivalents of all agents are equated. The-
refore, when there are no risks, which corresponds to complete markets in the competitive
entrepreneurship model, welfare gains from marginal redistribution are canceled out, ending
up with no welfare improvement in net. However, when there are risks in entrepreneurship,
the constrained planner's intervention that uses price change to redistribute consumption
from risk-free jobs to risky jobs has different impacts on the certainty equivalents of the two
groups. Therefore, the constrained planner can find a welfare-improving intervention.
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Such explanation differs from saying that there is a pecuniary externality and the con-
strained planner can improve welfare by internalizing it. The latter offers a verbal summary
of the mathematical results, but it does not explain why constrained planner can improve
welfare only when the markets are incomplete. The fact that agents' decisions have pecuni-
ary externalities is true no matter whether markets are complete or not, but the constrained
planner can find welfare-improving intervention only when the markets are incomplete. In
other words, since the instruments that the constrained planner can use are exactly the same
as agents in the market equilibrium, it is not clear why the market cannot internalize the
pecuniary externality. To get the economic intuition, therefore, it is necessary to understand
what the market does and how the constrained planner improves the welfare only when
markets are incomplete.
To highlight the subtlety of the argument, we contrast the competitive entrepreneurship
model with Aiyagari and Krebs models. Both of them are known to verify constrained
inefficiency if and only if there are uninsurable risks, and have structures simple enough
to be explained without heavy notation. The former features consumption-saving decision
while the latter illustrates the portfolio choice. By showing these two examples, we argue
that the difficulty of intuitively explaining constraint inefficiency is a prevalent problem. We
quote the explanations of the intuitions from the Davila et al. [2012] and Toda [2015], and
point out what is missing from the intuitions.
Our paper belongs to the literature of the constrained efficiency analysis pioneered by
Diamond [1967]. Our result shares the same flavor as the generic constrained inefficiency of
incomplete markets. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986], Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986],
Geanakoplos et al. [1990]) However, the determinant of constrained inefficiency in our model
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is not the position of endowment vectors but is the existence of entrepreneurial risks. In
addition, by exploiting the simple structure where agents face only two alternatives, we can
clarify the intuition of how exactly incomplete market leads to constrained inefficiency. Other
papers that analyze constrained efficiency by exploiting the simple structure of two choices
include Farhi et al. [2009] that study Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Davila et al. [2012] that
study Aiyagari [1994] and Toda [2015], Gottardi et al. [2016] that study Krebs [2003]. We
contribute to this strand of literature by studying the constrained efficiency of the standard
occupation choice model. (Lucas [1978], Kanbur [1979b,a, 1982]) Davila and Korinek [2017]
study the constrained efficiency in a model with both risks and collateral constraints.
2.2 Two simple examples of constrained inefficiency
In this section, we show two simple models in which the market equilibrium is constrained
inefficient. We argue that the difficulty of understanding the economic intuition comes from
the interpretation of the marginal condition that characterizes the market equilibrium.
2.2.1 Aiyagari model
Following Davila et al. [2012], we illustrate the constrained inefficiency using the two-period
version of Aiyagari [1994].
The economy consists of ex-ante identical households of mass 1 endowed with 1 unit of
asset and a representative firm with constant returns to scale technology. In the first period,
households decide the amount of saving a. The saving generates return r in the second period.
Households on average earn labor income w in the second period but face idiosyncratic labor
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endowment risks σ distributed according to G in the second period satisfying Eσ = 1 and
P (σ > 0) = 1. Formally, households solve
max
a
u (1− a) + Eu (ra+ wσ) , (2.1)
where the utility function u is increasing, concave and twice differentiable. The representative
firm uses capital and labor to produce.
max
K,L
f (K,L)− rK − wL (2.2)
Since the production technology is constant returns to scale, we do not have to specify
dividend payment. Finally, markets for saving/capital and labor clear.
a = K, 1 = L. (2.3)
The equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Fix (u, f, σ). (a, r, w) is a market equilibrium if the following three condi-
tions are satisfied.
(i) Given (r, w), a solves equation (2.1).
(ii) Given (r, w), (a, 1) solves equation (2.2).
(iii) Markets clear (2.3).
The market equilibrium saving am can be characterized by a single equation. To see this,
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note that prices can be solved in closed form from (2.2)
(r (a) , w (a)) := (fK (a, 1) , fL (a, 1)) .
Substituting these prices into the household's first order condition gives
u′ (1− am) = r (am)Eu′ (r (am) am + w (am)σ) . (2.4)
One can interpret Eq. (2.4) as equating marginal benefit and cost, but it is not clear whether
there is room for efficiency improvement or not.
The constrained planner examines the efficiency by choosing savings on behalf of house-
holds, but taking into account all the general equilibrium effects.
Definition 2.2. Fix (u, f, σ). acp is constrained efficient if
acp = arg max
a
u (1− a) + Eu (r (a) a+ w (a)σ) .
For the constrained planner's problem to be concave, we need to impose conditions on
the third derivative of the production function f ′′′. This is because the prices (r (a) , w (a))
are derived from the first-order conditions. Since there are no standard assumptions on
the third derivative of production functions, we simply assume the production function is
Cobb-Douglas in the following analyses.
As shown in Davila et al. [2012], the constrained planner chooses less saving acp < am,
so the households save too much. Since Davila et al. [2012] solves the special case where σ
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takes two values, we restate the result in a general form. The proof that follows shows the
typical argument of the constrained inefficiency in the literature.
Proposition 2.1. If the production function f takes the Cobb-Douglas (CD) form, the com-
petitive market creates excessive saving acp < am if and only if there are risks V (σ) 6= 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the planner's problem is concave.
Define the objective function as
U (a) := u (1− a) + Eu (r (a) a+ w (a)σ) .
Then, the first and second order derivatives can be written as
U ′ (a) = −u′ (1− a) + E [u′ (r (a) a+ w (a)σ) (r (a) + r′ (a) a+ w′ (a)σ)] (2.5)
U ′′ (a) =u′′ (1− a) + E
[
u′′ (r (a) a+ w (a)σ) (r (a) + r′ (a) a+ w′ (a)σ)2
]
+ E [u′ (r (a) a+ w (a)σ) (r′′ (a) a+ 2r′ (a) + w′′ (a)σ)]
Now, recall the definition (r (a) , w (a)) := (fK (a, 1) , fL (a, 1)). If f (K,L) = KαL1−α, then
w′′ (a) = fLKK (a, 1) = −α (1− α)2 aα−2 < 0 and
r′′ (a) a+ 2r′ (a) = fKKK (a, 1) a+ 2fKK (a, 1) = −α2 (1− α) aα−2 < 0.
Hence, the problem U (a) is strictly concave.
Second, we show that the planner's objective function is strictly decreasing when evalu-
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ated at the market equilibrium. To see this, evaluate the constrained planner's first order
derivative (2.5) at the market equilibrium. Then, from equation (2.4),
U ′ (am) = E [u′ (r (am) am + w (am)σ) (r′ (am) am + w′ (am)σ)] .
Since f is homogeneous of degree 1, differentiating fK (K,L)K + fL (K,L)L = f (K,L)
with respect to K gives
fKK (a, 1) a+ fKL (a, 1) = 0.
Hence, the first order condition evaluated at the market equilibrium
U ′ (am) = E [u′ (r (am) am + w (am)σ) r′ (am) am (1− σ)]
= Cov (u′ (r (am) am + w (am)σ) , fKK (am, 1) am (1− σ))
is negative iff V (σ) > 0. Hence, am > acp iff V (σ) > 0.
As can be seen from the proof, the key step is that the first-order condition evaluated at
market equilibrium am, U ′ (am), combined with (2.4), reduces to the pecuniary externality
term.
U ′ (am) = E [u′ (r (am) am + w (am)σ) (r′ (am) am + w′ (am)σ)] .
This term can be called pecuniary externality term because it represents the welfare impact
of increasing saving through prices (r′ (a) , w′ (a)). This pecuniary term is 0 if and only if
there are no risks V (σ) = 0, or the market is complete. Davila et al. [2012] explains the
constrained inefficiency as follows.
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The intuitive reason for the overaccumulation of capital is as follows. More
capital savings raises wages and lowers rental rates. The only source of market
failure in this economy is the incomplete insurance. A small decrease in a from
the equilibrium level thus lowers w and raises r, thereby scaling down the part of
the consumer's income that is stochastic and scaling up the part that is determi-
nistic: the amount of risk the consumer is exposed to is now smaller. Given that
there is no direct insurance for this risk, this amounts to an improvement. The
distortion on the agents' savings by moving savings away from the competitive
equilibrium level for given prices is of a second-order magnitude, and thus the
manipulation of prices so as to lower the de facto risk dominates.
The problem of the intuition is that the fact that the planner's intervention reduces risk
exposure does not automatically imply improvement. The constrained planner can further
reduce risk by decreasing acp to acp− , but acp−  is not an improvement from acp. In other
words, the key step of the logic is to understand why market equilibrium is not optimal, but
the above explanation does not address it. In order to understand why market equilibrium
is not optimal, we need a model in which one can see clearly what the market does.
2.2.2 Krebs model
Another simple model that can be reduced to a single dimension optimization problem is
Krebs [2003]. Gottardi et al. [2016] and Toda [2015] study the efficiency property. While Ai-
yagari [1994] illustrates the inter-temporal trade-off, Krebs [2003] highlights portfolio choice.
The economy consists of ex-ante identical households of mass 1 endowed with 1 unit of
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the all-purpose good and a representative firm with constant returns to scale technology.
All-purpose good can become either physical capital or human capital. Households decide
how much to invest in physical capital, which generates return r, and how much in human
capital, which generates return w. As in Aiyagari [1994], households face idiosyncratic labor




Eu (rk + σwl) s.t. k + h = 1. (2.6)
The representative firm uses physical capital and human labor to produce.
max
K,L
f (K,L)− rK − wL (2.7)
Since the production technology is constant returns to scale, we do not have to specify
dividend payment. Finally, markets for both types of capital clear
k = K, l = L. (2.8)
Definition 2.3. Fix (u, f,G). (k, l,K, L, r, w) is a market equilibrium if the following three
conditions are satisfied.
(i) Given (r, w), (k, l) solves equation (2.6).
(ii) Given (r, w), (K,L) solves equation (2.7).
(iii) Markets clear (2.8).
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The equilibrium prices can be solved in closed form
(r (k) , w (k)) = (fK (k, 1− k) , fL (k, 1− k)) .
By substituting prices out from the households' optimization condition, the market equili-
brium saving level km can be characterized by a single equation.
E [u′ (r (km) km + σw (km) (1− km)) (r (km)− σw (km))] = 0. (2.9)
The constrained planner chooses savings on behalf of households, but it takes into account
all the general equilibrium effects.
Definition 2.4. Fix (u, f,G). acp is constrained efficient if
kcp = arg max
k
Eu (r (k) k + σw (k) (1− k)) .
One can see the constrained inefficiency using a similar argument.
Proposition 2.2. If the production function f takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the competitive
market creates excessive capital investment kcp < km if and only if there are risks V (σ) > 0.
Proof. First, the planner's problem is concave. Define
U (k) = Eu (r (k) k + σw (k) (1− k)) .
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Then, since f (K,L) = KαL1−α,
U (k) = Eu
({α + σ (1− α)} kα (1− k)1−α) .
Since k 7→ kα (1− k)1−α is a strictly concave function, so is its strictly concave transformation
u
({α + σ (1− α)} kα (1− k)1−α), and therefore the weighted sum U (k) is strictly concave.
One can see that the planner's solution is k = α.
U ′ (k) = 0⇔ k = α.
If the planner's FOC is evaluated at market equilibrium km, we have
U ′ (km) = E [u′ (r (km) km + σw (km) (1− km)) (r′ (km) km + r (km) + σw′ (km) (1− km)− σw (km))]
= E [u′ (r (km) km + σw (km) (1− km)) (r′ (km) km + σw′ (km) (1− km))] ,
where the second equality follows from households' optimization condition. Note that under
the Cobb-Douglas assumption,
E [r′ (k) k + σw′ (k) (1− k)] = α (1− α)
k (1− k) k
α (1− k)1−α E (σ − 1) = 0.
Hence, U ′ (km) can be written as the covariance of a decreasing and increasing functions of
σ
U ′ (km) = Cov
(
u′ (r (km) km + σw (km) (1− km)) , α (1− α)
km (1− km) (k




This term is strictly negative iff σ has variance. Hence, kcp < km iff V (σ) > 0.
Toda [2015] explains the intuition as follows.
The intuition for the generic constraint inefficiency result is straightforward. ...
the return on an individual's portfolio depends on the portfolio choice of other
agents through the effect on rental rates. In essence, there is a `portfolio exter-
nality', which makes the economy inefficient.
The problem of the intuition is that the portfolio externality exists even when there are
no risks V (σ) = 0. Therefore, the portfolio externality or pecuniary externality itself does
not imply constrained inefficiency. The economic intuition has to address why pecuniary
externality matters only when there are risks, and does not when there are no risks. Again,
the economic intuition requires understanding why market equilibrium is not efficient, but
the structure of the model is not suitable to see what the market does.
2.3 Competitive entrepreneurship model
The economic intuition of constrained inefficiency can be obtained in the competitive risky
entrepreneurship model. Such model traces back to Kanbur [1979a], but its constrained
efficiency result has not been investigated. We show that the model makes the economic
intuition of constrained inefficiency transparent because it is easy to see what the market
equilibrium does.
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical risk-averse agents of mass 1. Each agent is
endowed with 1 unit of labor that can be spent in running a firm or working for a firm. If she
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chooses to be an entrepreneur, she observes her entrepreneurial productivity zi distributed
according to G, and then given wage w, decides the number of employees n to maximize the
profit
[pi (z, w) , n (z, w)] = max
n
zf (n)− wn. (2.10)
The notation indicates pi and n are the value and policy functions of the maximization
problem on the right-hand side. If she chooses to become a worker, she receives wage w
independent of her entrepreneurial productivity z. Given the payoffs of the two occupations,
each agent chooses the occupation that maximizes her welfare
φ = max
e∈[0,1]
eE [u (pi (z, w))] + (1− e)u (w) (2.11)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the productivity z. Note that the choice
variable e, representing whether to become an entrepreneur, can take continuous values
e ∈ [0, 1]. This formulation allows agents to take mixed strategy. We focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all agents take the same strategy φ. Since the total population is 1, φ also
represents the mass of entrepreneurs. Hence, the labor market clearing condition becomes
φEn (z, w) = 1− φ. (2.12)
where the left-hand side is the labor demand and right side denotes the labor supply.
The market equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. Fix (u, f,G). (pi, n, φ, w) is a market equilibrium if the following three
conditions are satisfied.
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(i) Given w, (pi, n) solves (2.10).
(ii) Given w, φ solves (2.11).
(iii) Market clears (2.12).
What makes the framework suitable for understanding the constrained inefficiency is
that it is easy to see what the market equilibrium does since the optimality condition does
not involve derivatives. In particular, the market equilibrium wage wm makes sure the two
occupations are indifferent in equilibrium.
Eu (pi (z, wm)) = u (wm) . (2.13)
In other words, the market makes sure the certainty equivalent of the two occupations equal.
We consider the constrained efficiency of the occupation choice. Suppose the planner
chooses occupation on behalf of agents, but just as in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the planner
does not intervene in the production decisions. Therefore, the price w (φ) can be implicitly
defined by the market clearing condition (2.12).
Definition 2.6. Fix (u, f,G). φcp is constrained efficient if
φcp = arg max
φ
φEu (pi (z, w (φ))) + (1− φ)u (w (φ)) .
Compared to the market equilibrium, the constrained planner is not constrained by the
indifference condition (2.13).
A similar mathematical argument as section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 leads to the constrained
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inefficiency result. To illustrate the economic intuition, we present a heuristic explanation
and the corresponding mathematical equations, relegating the formal mathematical proof to
Appendix B.1.1.
Proposition 2.3. Let φm be the market equilibrium number of entrepreneurs. If (u, f) take
the form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and CD, φm < φcp if and only if there
are risks V (z) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.1.
We divide the intuition into two parts, why the market equilibrium is constrained ineffi-
cient φm 6= φcp and why the direction of market failure points to insufficiency φm < φcp.
2.3.1 Why is market equilibrium constrained inefficient φm 6= φcp?
The intuition of the constrained inefficiency φm 6= φcp can be understood by using certainty
equivalent. Note that the certainty equivalent of the workers is the wage itself cW = w since





= Eu (pi (z, w)) . (2.14)
As a result of the indifference condition (2.13), cE = cW , so the marginal utilities evaluated










This is true no matter whether there are entrepreneurial risks or not.
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What the planner can do is to change the wage w by changing the number of entrepre-
neurs φ through market equilibrium. To understand how the planner improves, suppose for
simplicity that there are the same number of workers and entrepreneurs φm = 1
2
, and that
the aggregate output is fixed Y (φm) so that the constrained planner's intervention is a pure
redistribution. The equilibrium number of entrepreneurs φm can be controlled by varying
the production technology α, and Appendix B.2 shows that output is indeed constant for a
marginal intervention by the constrained planner. Now, suppose the planner increases the
wage w marginally by 1 unit from the market equilibrium wm.
If there are no entrepreneurial risks, consumption and certainty equivalents are identical.
The fact that there are equal mass of workers and entrepreneurs and output is fixed implies
that, when workers' consumption increases by 1 unit, entrepreneurs' consumption decreases
by exactly the same 1 unit ∆cW = −∆cE = 1. Since the marginal utilities of the certainty


























This is why the market is constrained efficient when there are no entrepreneurial risks.
If there are entrepreneurial risks, however, the 1 unit increase of the workers' consump-
tion ∆cW = 1 does not necessarily correspond to the 1 unit decrease of the entrepreneurs'
certainty equivalent of consumption ∆cE 6= −1, since the wage change might affect the distri-
bution of profit pi (z, w) and therefore affects both the expected profit and its risk premium.
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so that the planner can find welfare gain out of this redistribution. Note that the difference
of the argument from no-risk case is whether the wage change affects the risk premium of
the entrepreneurs' consumption or not.
This heuristic explanation can be backed by the corresponding equations. To see this,
note that the first-order condition of the constrained planner evaluated at the market equi-
librium is
U ′ (φm) =
{
φm
∂Eu (pi (z, wm))
∂w




w′ (φm) . (2.16)
In terms of the economics, Eq. (2.16) corresponds to the thought experiment of the marginal
wage increase that we just discussed. Specifically, a marginal increase in wage causes a
redistribution of consumption between the two occupations. To connect Eq. (2.16) to the
risk premium, define the risk premium R (w) of entrepreneurs
Eu (pi (z, w)) = u (Epi (z, w)−R (w)) . (2.17)
The key observation is that the risk premium R (w) depends on the wage w. After some
manipulation detailed in Appendix B.2, we obtain the final form
U ′ (φm) = −φmu′ (wm)w′ (φm)R′ (wm) . (2.18)
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This expression decomposes the channel through which the increase in the number of en-
trepreneurs affects welfare. In particular, an increase in the number of entrepreneurs raises
wage due to tighter labor market, w′ (φ) > 0, which then impacts the risk premium R′ (w).
The final welfare impact is measured in utility term u′ (wm) > 0, and its total size depends
on the number of entrepreneurs φm > 0.
One thing that might be surprising in Eq. (2.18) is that the expansion of aggregate
output Y ′ (φm) does not show up. The reason is subtle. As detailed in Appendix B.2,
although output does increase Y ′ (φm) > 0, the agent who changes the occupation from
worker to entrepreneur needs to be compensated by exactly the same amount as Y ′ (φm) to
be indifferent between the two occupations. Therefore, the marginal welfare gain of increase
in the number of entrepreneurs does not come from output increase, but solely from the risk
premium reduction.
A novel insight from Eq. (2.18) is that the elasticity of the risk premium R′ (wm) is
a sufficient statistics for the existence of market failure and its direction. This is because
R′ (wm) is the only term that has an ambiguous sign in Eq. (2.18). Therefore, the competitive
market generates insufficient entrepreneurs U ′ (φm) > 0 if and only if the risk premium can
be reduced by increasing wage R′ (wm) < 0. Note that this is the formal description of the






Figure 2.1: The planner's objective function and the distributions of the entrepreneurs' profit
pi (z, w).
2.3.2 Why are entrepreneurs insufficient φm < φcp?
The previous section has shown that the elasticity of the risk premium is a sufficient statistics
for the sign of market failure. A natural question is what are the factors that determine
the sign of the elasticity of the risk premium R′ (wm)? To answer this question intuitively,
suppose that the wage increases. As Fig.2.1 shows, there are two forces that affect the risk
premium R (w).
On one hand, the distribution of the entrepreneurs' consumption shifts to the left since
the profit pi (z, w) is a decreasing function of the wage w. This shift moves the distribution
to a more risk-averse region of the utility function, so it raises the risk premium R (w).
On the other hand, the variance of the profit goes down. Such decline becomes salient if
one takes the limit w →∞, in which case the profit goes to pi (z, w)→ 0 for all productivity
levels z. This effect reduces the risk premium R (w).
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Therefore, the elasticity is determined by the relative importance of these two forces.
Under the standard parameterization, i.e., CRRA utility and Cobb-Douglas production
functions, the latter force always wins, i.e., R′ (w) < 0 for all w > 0 including the mar-
ket equilibrium wage wm. However, this is not true in general. The next proposition states
that there is a set of fundamentals (u, f,G) that satisfy standard assumptions but generates
an excess number of entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2.4. There exists a set of fundamentals (u, f,G) such that (u, f) is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satisfy Inada conditions and the resulting market equilibrium
generates an excessive number of entrepreneurs compared to constrained efficient level φcp <
φm.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
The proof provides an example in which a wage increase raises risk premium R′ (wm) > 0.
Intuitively, such scenario is possible if agents suddenly become more risk averse when con-
sumption is below some threshold. Under such utility function, the force that makes agents
risk averse jumps up, but the force that reduces the variance of profit pi works smoothly.
Given the intuition of Fig.2.1, such preference justifies the reduction of wage and therefore
reduction of entrepreneurs φcp < φm. Mathematically, the proof in Appendix B.1.2 presents
an example in which the utility function exhibits a discontinuity in the curvature. Thus,
proposition 2.4 highlights the subtlety of the constrained inefficiency.
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2.4 Concluding remarks
We have discussed the intuition of constrained inefficiency in the framework of competitive
risky entrepreneurship. We have pointed out the difficulty of understanding the economic in-
tuition of constrained inefficiency even in the simplest models in which the individual agents
face one-dimensional optimization problem. We then present the competitive entrepreneurs-
hip model, whose market equilibrium is easy to understand, so that one can transparently see
how and why the constrained planner's intervention improves welfare. Future research should
explore the constrained inefficiency in other types of models such as financial constraints.
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Chapter 3
Intensive Margin of the Volcker Rule:
Price Quality and Welfare
Sakai Ando and Misaki Matsumura
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3.1 Introduction
The Volcker rule, named after Paul Volcker (Volcker [2010]), is one of the most important
regulations after the Great Recession designed to prevent future financial crises. It limits
the ability of banking entities as dealers to take risks on their own books by banning pro-
prietary tradings and other activities described in the Final Rule.1 Although the necessity
of restricting the excessive risk taking by banking entities is widely agreed, as discussed in
Duffie [2012] and summarized in the Final Rule, the specific regulation targeted at the risk
taking of dealers has invoked various concerns about its economic implications. Despite the
importance of the policy and active public debates, there has been no theoretical analysis
on the validity of these concerns. In particular, one of the immediate concerns is about the
intensive margin (short-term impacts);2 the dealer regulation that ties the hands of price
making institutions deteriorates the quality of price (informativeness and volatility) and
therefore has a negative welfare impact.
This paper studies in a general equilibrium framework the robustness of this conventional
wisdom about the intensive margin. Our main result is that the dealer regulation may lower
price quality and dealer's profitability as in the conventional wisdom, but at the same time
if general equilibrium effect is taken into consideration, it may raise the welfare of other
market participants against the conventional wisdom. In two extensions of the baseline
model, we also argue that this novel insight on the welfare is robust, while the conventional
1Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with,
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, Office of the Federal Register, Vol.79, No. 21, National Archives
and Records Administration.
2The extensive margin, on the other hand, is mainly about the unknown consequences of the migration of
dealers to unregulated areas. Given that the extensive margin has not materialized as Kelleher et al. [2016]
argues, this paper focuses on the intensive margin.
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wisdom about the deteriorating price quality is fragile to the introduction of dynamics and
endogenous information acquisition.
Our welfare analysis deepens the debate on the dealer regulation by identifying the dis-
tribution of cost bearing. The typical discussion of dealer regulation focuses on the trade-off
between the benefit from lower systemic risk and the cost due to efficiency loss caused by
constraints imposed on dealers. This paper elaborates on the discussion of the cost by iden-
tifying dealers as the only group of market participants who bear the cost even though all
the market participants face a less informative and more volatile price.
To demonstrate the seemingly counter-intuitive results rigorously, the baseline model
formally describes the general equilibrium force that improves the welfare of non-dealers
despite the price quality deterioration. The price quality deterioration that the baseline mo-
del captures is based on the same mechanism as the one widely discussed in public comments
summarized in the Final Rule; if the dealer is not allowed to buffer temporary supply and
demand imbalances, the price she quotes has to reflect those imbalances rather than econo-
mic fundamentals, and therefore becomes less informative and more volatile. Accordingly,
one can show her expected profit decreases. The intuition behind the seemingly counter-
intuitive welfare results is that, in a general equilibrium, somebody has to hold risky assets.
If a dealer regulation restricts the dealer's risk-taking ability, the risky assets held previously
by the dealer have to be held by other market participants. The only way for a dealer to
induce other market participants to hold risky assets is to quote an attractive price for them,
resulting in a welfare redistribution from the dealer to other market participants. At the
same time, for other market participants to accept more risks, this welfare redistribution has
to be large enough to make them better off.
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To critically evaluate the robustness of our mechanism, we relax the two simplifying
assumptions in the baseline model in the two extensions. These exercises not only validate
the robustness of our welfare results but also point out the fragility of the conventional
wisdom about price quality. In the first extension, since the baseline model specifies the
initial endowments of risky assets exogenously, which can drive the welfare results, we use the
dynamic model to obtain the endogenous steady state inventories of risky assets. The analysis
suggests that the welfare implications in the baseline model survive in the steady state, but
the price volatility decreases against the conventional wisdom. In the second extension, we
endogenize the precision of the signal about the economic fundamentals, which is the key
ingredient in the baseline model to capture the price informativeness. The extension suggests
that the welfare results of the baseline model are again robust, but the price informativeness
might increase against conventional wisdom.
The Volcker rule and how we map it to a stylized model. In analyzing the effect
of the Volcker rule, the obvious challenge is how to map the complicated actual regulation
into an economic model. In particular, a large portion of the debates on the Volcker rule
focuses on the difficulty of telling the proprietary trading from pure dealing. We argue that
even if the regulators cannot cleanly detect proprietary tradings, the Volcker rule works as a
deterrence device so that the impact of the Volcker rule, at least qualitatively, can be analyzed
by considering the effective risk aversion of the dealer. In the following, we illustrate the
institutional details of the Volcker rule and the justification for using the effective risk
aversion of the dealer as the modeling device. For the complete description, see the Final
Rule.
The Volcker rule is a section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
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Protection Act. It bars banks from engaging in proprietary trading and having relationships
with covered funds, with several exemptions including market making. To achieve this
goal, the rule mandates that each bank under regulation runs a compliance program and
requires big banks to report to regulators seven quantitative measures of trading activities,
which are calculated every day for each individual trading desk.3 Enforcement tools include
criminal and civil penalties,4 which are presumably used as a threat to incentivize banks to
police themselves as part of their compliance program. Although the Volcker rule has not
been applied against any cases yet, some argue that a good predictor of actual punishment
procedure is the so-called London Whale trading mess, which eventually cost J.P. Morgan
Chase $920 million in fines (Henning [2013]).
We map the implementation of the Volcker rule to the increase in the dealer's effective
risk aversion parameter. In section 3.2.3, we micro-found our comparative statics by showing
how a severer threat of possible regulatory intervention can be mapped to a higher effective
risk aversion parameter of the dealer.
One can also simply interpret that our choice of modeling describes an idealistic regu-
lation; since the absolute goal of the Volcker rule is to reduce dealers' excessive risk taking
activities, the comparative statics in the dealer's effective risk aversion is a direct thought
experiment on its effect. Therefore, our analysis is robust to possible future changes in
the actual implementation of the Volcker rule, and is applicable to potential similar dealer
regulations outside of the U.S. that share the same goal.
In reality, however, due to the difficulty of detecting proprietary trading, the Volcker
3See the Final Rule, III.D and III.E for overviews of metrics reporting and compliance program require-
ment.
4See the Final Rule, IV.C.4. for other possible enforcement tools.
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rule might not be able to perfectly achieve what it intends. In this case, one may be more
interested in the effect of the Volcker rule when it can only achieve its goal to some extent,
i.e., when the Volcker rule can eliminate some but not all risk takings on dealers' own books.
Our comparative statics in a continuum of the effective risk aversion levels can provide
insights on all such intermediate cases. We provide further discussions in section 3.2.3.
Literature. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to formally analyze
the Volcker rule based on an internally consistent general equilibrium model, although the
economic implications of the dealer regulation themselves have attracted interest after the
financial crisis of 2007. The Final Rule summarizes public comments that reflect a wide
range of opinions from both academia and industries. Duffie [2012] is one of the critical
assessments of the Volcker rule based on various empirical and theoretical research. Trebbi
and Xiao [2015] report that the Volcker rule has not produced structural deterioration in
market liquidity. Kelleher et al. [2016] argues that the incumbent big dealers are still in their
positions since they find legal loop holes and discourage new entrants. We complement these
contributions by formalizing the mechanisms behind some of the concerns about the intensive
margin, and pointing out a novel insight on welfare implications of the dealer regulation.
From the modeling point of view, our baseline model is an extension of Grossman and
Stiglitz [1980] with a monopolistic and risk averse dealer who quotes the price, and our infinite
horizon model is a descendant of Wang [1994]. Another paper that also extends Grossman
and Stiglitz [1980] with a risk averse dealer is Liu and Wang [2016], which studies the bid-ask
spreads under information asymmetry in a static model. As a modeling contribution, we
show that a price making dealer can be cleanly embedded in both the static and dynamic
frameworks, enabling us to isolate the effect of the dealer regulation from initial inventories
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of risky assets. See Vives [2010] for a coherent summary of the extensive literature on the
dealership in general.
The negative correlation between informativeness and welfare of market participants in
our model may remind some readers of the Hirshleifer effect, which describes that better
information can make market participants worse off by destroying insurance opportunity.
(Hirshleifer [1971]) However, as opposed to Hirshleifer effect, a change in informativeness is
not the cause of a change in welfare in our model. Both price quality and welfare redistri-
bution are the consequences of the dealer's risk shifting. In this sense, our model points out
a mechanism that is different from that of the Hirshleifer effect.
In this paper, we focus on the intensive margin, although the extensive margin is also a
big portion of debates on the Volcker rule. For instance, Duffie [2012] discusses unpredictable
consequences of dealer's migration to unregulated sectors. A direct analysis of entry and exit
in OTC markets can be found in Atkeson et al. [2015]. An interesting result of the three-type
entry model of Atkeson et al. [2015] is that regulating dealer banks improves welfare, because
in their model there is an excessive intermediation relative to socially optimal level. Although
our analysis demonstrates that all other market participants than the dealer are better off,
our mechanism is different from Atkeson et al. [2015]; we focus on welfare redistribution
through price level, while this channel is muted in Atkeson et al. [2015], in which price is
determined by Nash bargaining.
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3.2 Baseline model
In this section, we describe the main intuition in a static model. We show as a result of
dealer regulation, price quality deteriorates and dealer's expected profit declines, but the
welfare of other market participants improves.
3.2.1 Environment and definition
The baseline model contains two ingredients necessary to analyze the effects of dealer regu-
lation on price quality and welfare: a price quoting dealer and a signal extraction problem.
First, to formally think about the dealer's pricing channel, it is necessary to introduce a
dealer who quotes price optimally. As a consequence of introducing optimal pricing, the
standard pricing mechanism based on demand and supply is extended to an optimal in-
ventory management problem, in which the dealer's optimal price pins down the trade-off
between higher expected profit and riskier inventory, instead of clearing the excess demand.5
Second, to discuss price informativeness, we introduce a signal extraction problem so that
agents endogenously learn valuable information from equilibrium objects. In particular, we
introduce heterogeneous traders such that some agents have private information about fun-
damentals. The dealer learns such private information through order flows, and quotes price
optimally based on it. Since the price quoted is based on the extracted private information,
the price itself is also informative about the fundamentals. Thus, the informativeness of
equilibrium objects are determined endogenously.
5This connection between a dealer's inventory and her pricing has been emphasized in the literature
(Amihud and Mendelson [1980], Ho and Stoll [1983], Treynor [1987], Grossman and Miller [1988], Hansch
et al. [1998], and Liu and Wang [2016]) and became salient in the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 where the
reduced dealer capacity resulted in dramatic downward distortions in corporate bond prices. (Duffie [2012])
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Formally, there is one asset in the economy traded by three types of agents, insiders I
with mass λ ∈ (0, 1), outsiders O with mass 1−λ, and a dealer D. We call insiders and out-
siders, combined, traders. Each player has a constant absolute risk aversion utility function
(CARA), with parameters θ > 0 for the traders and θD > 0 for the dealer. The economy



















d denotes the return of the risky asset in the economy, which nobody can observe. z := d+ 
is the signal on d that only insiders can observe. s is the dealer's inventory of the asset,
which only the dealer can observe. Risky inventory s can be positive or negative, reflecting
that the dealer can take either a long or short position. In the following, terminologies used
to explain economic intuitions and interpretations assume the asset is valuable d¯ > 1 and
inventory is positive s¯ > 0 on average, although symmetric arguments apply to other cases.
We work on the following equilibrium. Fix exogenous parameters
{
θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, κ, λ
}
.
Let Ei be the conditional expectation operator conditional on the σ-algebra generated by
the information set Fi of agent i = I, O,D.
Definition 3.1. A set of price and demand functions
{
p (z, s) , xBI (z, p) , x
B
O (p) , x
B (z, p)
}
constitutes an equilibrium if
1. (Traders) Demand functions xBI (z, p) and x
B
O (p) are best responses to the price quoted
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by the dealer p (z, s).
xBI (z, p) = arg max
x
EI
[−e−θ(d−p)x] , FI = {p (z, s) , z} , (3.2)
xBO (p) = arg max
x
EO
[−e−θ(d−p)x] , FO = {p (z, s)} . (3.3)
Aggregate demand satisfies xB (z, p) = λxBI (z, p) + (1− λ)xBO (p).
2. (Dealer) Price quoted by the dealer p (z, s) is a best response to the aggregate demand
xB (z, p).








s, xB (z, p)
}
. (3.4)
Note that it is straightforward to introduce a risk-free interest rate 1 + r and the initial
wealth of the traders w0. Without loss of generality due to CARA normal framework, r and
w0 can be set to be 0.
The interpretation of each agent's problem is as follows. The traders are price takers
and extract information about the return d from the price p (z, s). Given the information,
the traders optimally choose the demand schedule p 7→ xBi , which sums up to the aggregate
demand xB (z, p). The superscript B represents best response. The dealer is a demand
taker and extracts information about the return d from xB (z, p). Based on the information,
she quotes the price optimally by controlling the sum of the certain profit pxB (z, p) and
the risky inventory
{
s− xB (z, p)} d. The equilibrium requires the quoted price to coincide
with the price p (z, s) taken as given by the traders. Thus, the pair of price and demand{
p (z, s) , xB (z, p)
}
that closes this loop constitutes a fixed point. In equilibrium, the dealer
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can infer the signal z from the demand schedule due to the affine structure stated in theorem
3.1, so that the outsiders are the only group of agents who do not observe the signal z.
The equilibrium objects can be used to define equilibrium trading volumes and welfare.
The trading volumes of individual agents and the total trading volume in equilibrium can be
obtained by substituting p in demand functions with p (z, s), i.e., xI (z, s) := xBI (z, p (z, s)),
xO (z, s) := x
B
O (p (z, s)), and x (z, s) := x
B (z, p (z, s)). With these equilibrium objects, we
can define the welfare of each agent. The welfare of the traders is measured by the ex-ante
utility
ui := E
[−e−θ{d−p(z,s)}xi(z,s)] , i = I, O. (3.5)
For the dealer, since we conduct a comparative statics with respect to θD as explained in
section 3.2.3, we adopt the expected profit as her welfare criterion to avoid mechanical welfare
changes.
uD := Epi (d, z, s) = E [sd+ {p (z, s)− d}x (z, s)] . (3.6)
The expected profit itself is of particular interest in the Final Rule, since some of the pu-
blic comments show the concern that U.S. banks lose international competitiveness due to
decreasing profitability.
3.2.2 Characterization of equilibrium
This section characterizes the affine structure of the equilibrium and defines the price infor-
mativeness.
The next theorem states that the equilibrium price and quantities are affine.
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Theorem 3.1. There is a unique equilibrium such that the price function p (z, s) is affine.
In this equilibrium, the demand and the trading volume functions are also affine. The unique
set of coefficients {αI , βI , γI , αO, βO, α, β, γ, A,B,C} of the equilibrium
p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs) , xB (z, p) = α + βp+ γz, (3.7)
xBI (z, p) = αI + βIp+ γIz, x
B
O (p) = αO + βOp (3.8)
satisfies BCβIγIβOβγ 6= 0, C < 0 < B, and
− κd + κ
θ
= βI < β = λβI + (1− λ) βO < βO < 0 < γ = λγI < γI . (3.9)
Proof. See Appendix C.1.6
The signs of (βI , βO, β) and (γI , γ) reflect respectively the law of demand and the fact
that a higher signal z on the return d pushes up demand of the asset. The difference in
the price elasticity |βO| < |βI | can be understood by noting that for outsiders, two forces
are at work in the opposite directions; an increase in price not only reduces their demand
by lowering the total return d− p, but also increases their demand by signaling the dealer's
information about the higher return d. Since the insiders observe z, they are only subject
to the former force. As a result, the aggregate demand function xB (z, p), which is a convex
combination of the traders' demand functions, is more responsive to price than outsiders
xBO (p) but less than insiders x
B
I (z, p). The positive sign of B reflects the incentive for the
6Whether the affine price function p (z, s) is unique in a larger set of functions, say, C1 or continuous
functions, remains to be open. Papers about the uniqueness in models of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] and
Kyle [1985] include Boulatov et al. [2012], Palvolgyi and Venter [2015], and Breon-Drish [2015].
91
dealer to raise her price when she faces a higher demand as a result of a better signal z. The
sign of C is negative since with a higher volume of inventory the risk averse dealer wants to
cut the price to dispose of her inventory.
Eq. (3.7) in theorem 3.1 suggests a natural way to define price informativeness. For the
outsiders, the term Cs is a noise that prevents them from inferring the signal z out of price
p (z, s). When the variance of the noise term V (Cs) is large relative to that of the signal
V (z), the variation of price function is dominated mainly by noise Cs, so that the price is
not informative about the valuable signal z. In contrast, if C = 0, the price fully reveals z.
Since the sign of C does not matter, we define the price informativeness as follows.
Definition 3.2. Consider the equilibrium characterized in theorem 3.1. The price informa-




Now that we have equilibrium objects, we are ready to discuss the dealer regulation.
3.2.3 Mapping the dealer regulation to the model
This section explains how we map the Volcker rule into the stylized model and provides a
formal micro-foundation as well as a verbal justification.
The way we map dealer regulation into the baseline model is to raise the dealer's risk
aversion parameter θD ∈ (0,∞). Such modeling choice reflects the interpretation that θD
represents the effective risk aversion rather than the deep preference parameter; due to
the dealer regulation that bans the dealer from taking risks, the dealer behaves as if she
becomes more risk averse. In particular, we analyze the comparative statics of (1) price
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informativeness Q, (2) price volatility V (p (z, s)), and (3) welfare of agents ui for i = I, O,D,
with respect to the dealer's effective risk aversion θD ∈ (0,∞).
As a micro-foundation, we justify our modeling choice by showing that controlling the risk
aversion of the dealer is observationally equivalent to the dealer regulation with imperfect
monitoring and pecuniary punishment. Suppose the dealer's true risk aversion is θ > 0 and
when she makes her pricing decision she knows that she has to submit a report about her
inventory to regulators, such as quantitative measures and annual certification by CEOs as
specified in the Volcker rule. We assume that regulators can only get noisy information m
about the risky inventory
m (p) = s− xB (z, p) + ξ (3.11)
where the noise ξ ∼ N (0, σ2ξ) is independent of the uncertainty X ′ = [d s ] and its accuracy
σ2ξ > 0 can be chosen by regulators for some costs. Based onm, regulators impose a pecuniary
punishment F (m). Suppose regulators are reluctant to impose one when |m| is close to 0
out of concern about false accusation, but are willing to impose a larger one when |m| → ∞.
A simple parametrization of such punishment is F (m) = α
2
m2 where α > 0 represents how



















The following proposition states that the two problems are equivalent, and therefore justifies
our parsimonious policy variable θD.
Proposition 3.1. For each regulation
(
σ2ξ , α
) ∈ R2++, there is an effective risk aversion
θD ∈ (θ,∞) such that the prices quoted in problem (3.12) and (3.13) are identical. The
converse is also true. For each effective risk aversion θD ∈ (θ,∞), there is a regulation(
σ2ξ , α
) ∈ R2++ such that the prices quoted in the two problems are identical.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
An implication of proposition 3.1 is that we can always order the severity of regulations
linearly. Such simplification not only makes the interpretations of the policy analyses simpler
but also makes the results robust to the details of the implementation in the stylized model.
A verbal justification is to interpret that our analysis describes the ideal scenario of
the Volcker rule, i.e., a scenario in which it can directly control the dealer's risk-taking on
her own books. In other words, we investigate the dealer regulation's mechanics which are
invariant to all possible implementations as long as they make the dealer effectively more
risk averse. Thus, our analysis provides a benchmark result that is robust to possible future
changes in the exact implementation of the Volcker rule, and is applicable to potential dealer
regulations outside of the U.S. that share the same goal.
For such justification to be valid, it is desirable to show that the policy variable θD can
fully span the situations of interest. Indeed, as the following proposition shows, by controlling
θD, we can capture both pure market making and pure proprietary trading.
Proposition 3.2. θD is a parameter that connects pure market making and pure proprietary
trading. That is, for any (z, s), x (z, s)→ s as θD →∞, and x (z, s)→ 0 as θD → 0.
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Proof. See Appendix C.3.
When the dealer becomes extremely risk averse θD → ∞, all assets are held by the
traders and therefore the dealer just makes market. This equilibrium is exactly the same
as Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. When θD → 0, the risk neutral dealer takes all the risks
on her own book. The intermediate cases 0 < θD < ∞ correspond to the realistic situation
where the Volcker rule deters proprietary trading only to some extent. Thus, by observing
the entire range of θD, we can obtain policy-relevant insights even if the regulation is not as
effective as is intended to be.
3.2.4 Results
The following theorem presents the analytical results. We also provide numerical results in
Fig.3.1 to help illustrate the global behaviors of equilibrium objects of interest and their
intuitions.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose the dealer becomes more risk averse. Price informativeness decrea-
ses. Price volatility eventually increases with sufficiently large inventory shocks. The welfare
of the traders improves. The welfare of the dealer deteriorates. Formally,





2. Price volatility eventually increases, limθD→0 V (p (z, s)) < limθD→∞ V (p (z, s)), if κs
is sufficiently small.
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Figure 3.1: The four figures describe the impact of the increase in θD on equilibrium objects of
interest. All the x axes are θD. Parameter values are set to be κd = κs = κ = θ = s¯ = 1, d¯ = 1.1
and λ = 0.1. Panel a shows that price informativeness deteriorates. Panel b shows that the price
volatility eventually increases. Panel c shows that the welfare of traders improves, and the welfare
difference widens. Panel d shows that the welfare of the dealer declines.
3. The welfare of the traders {uI , uO} defined in (3.5) is higher when θD > 0 than when
θD → 0.
4. The welfare of the dealer uD defined in (3.6) is higher when θD → 0 than when θD →∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
The driving force behind theorem 3.2 and Fig.3.1 is the risk-shifting motive of the dealer.
Note that the dealer's objective function is equivalent to
(
s− xB (z, p))E [d|z] + pxB (z, p)− θD
2
(
s− xB (z, p))2 V [d|z] . (3.14)
The first two terms are the expected return of the inventory and the income from selling
xB (z, p) units of the asset for the price p, and the third term governs the dis-utility from
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holding risky assets. As she becomes more risk averse θD → ∞, the third term dominates
the dealer's incentive so that she puts more weight on disposing her risky inventory, trying
to shift risky assets to other market participants.
With this in mind, the effect of the dealer regulation on price quality can be understood
in the same way as the conventional wisdom. When the dealer becomes more risk averse,
she is more interested in clearing her inventory, so that the information of z, which is useful
in raising expected profit but not in reducing the risk of her inventory, is reflected less in her
pricing decision. Therefore, the price she quotes becomes less informative about the return
d, and more about the inventory risk s, leading to lower price informativeness. Accordingly,
since the price has to move together with the inventory shock s to reduce the inventory risks,
if the volatility of inventory V s = κ−1s is high enough, price volatility eventually increases.
One force that could confound this intuition is the rise in the traders' price sensitivity |β|,
which contributes to the non-monotonicity of panel b. of Fig.3.1. Recall |βO| < |βI | since the
outsiders infer higher signal z from higher price p. As the dealer's risk aversion θD increases,
price informativeness decreases, so that outsiders no longer infer signal z from the price
function p (z, s). As a result, the outsiders' price sensitivity |βO| =
∣∣∂xBO (z, p) /∂p∣∣ increases,
which then raises the price sensitivity of aggregate demand |β| = ∣∣∂xB (z, p) /∂p∣∣. This
higher responsiveness |β| = ∣∣∂ (s− xB (z, p)) /∂p∣∣ makes it easier for the dealer to adjust
her inventory, so that the dealer may not have to change price as much to control inventory.
Although this force creates the non-monotonicity, it is of second order importance in the
limit.
What is new relative to the conventional wisdom is the result on the traders' welfare.
This welfare result can also be explained by the shift of the dealer's incentive. Since the
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dealer cannot absorb shocks using her own inventory due to additional risk aversion, some
of the risks have to be shifted to the traders. The only instrument the dealer has is the
price. Therefore, in order for her to shift risks to the traders, she has to compensate them
for their riskier positions by quoting a more attractive price than ever before. For the traders
to accept riskier positions, this benefit has to be large enough to make them better off. As a
result, welfare is redistributed from the dealer to the traders to the extent that the traders
are better off. Accordingly, the dealer's profitability deteriorates in exchange of less riskier
inventory.
One can also see in Fig.3.1.c that the traders' utility difference uI − uO increases. This
is a corollary of the deteriorating price informativeness. Since price is less informative as
θD → ∞, the informational advantage of the insiders over the outsiders increases, which
is then reflected in the welfare difference. In other words, uI − uO measures the value of
information, and it increases as the dealer becomes more risk averse.
3.2.5 Discussion
We discuss two potential concerns about the assumptions embedded in the baseline model:
(1) the exogenous initial endowments and (2) the exogenous information acquisition. These
assumptions are relaxed in the following extensions so that the robustness or the fragility of
the results in the baseline model are examined.
First, in the baseline model, the traders are not endowed with any risky asset for parsi-
mony. However, such simplification implies that the immediacy of trading comes from the
dealer. If the traders are endowed with a large amount of risky assets, the immediacy of
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trading comes from the traders, in which case the dealer regulation might make tradings
harder and deteriorate the welfare of the traders. To address such concern, in section 3.3,
we endogenize the risky asset holdings before transactions by deriving the steady state in
a dynamic model. In particular, we extend Wang [1994] to build a dynamic model with
steady state risky asset holdings on both the dealer's and the traders' sides, and conduct an
analogous policy analysis of the dealer regulation.
Second, we like to address the exogenous information acquisition by the insiders. In the
baseline model, the precision of the signal κ is exogenous. However, when the risk attitude of
the dealer changes, the insiders, knowing there will be less information in equilibrium, might
have incentives to strengthen their information acquisition activity. To see if the results in
the baseline model are robust to the introduction of the endogenous information acquisition,
in section 3.4, we allow κ to depend on θD, and conduct the same policy analysis as in the
baseline model.
3.3 Dynamic model
This section argues that the welfare results of the baseline model survive even when the
exogenous initial endowments are endogenized as the steady state of a dynamic model. We
also show that the increase in price volatility, which is a part of the conventional wisdom
derived in the baseline model, does not survive.
As discussed in section 3.2.5, the exogenous endowments in the baseline model has to be
endogenized to deal with the concerns about the immediacy of tradings. For this purpose,
we extend the baseline model along Wang [1994] by adding a price-making dealer.
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3.3.1 Environment and definition
There are one price-making dealer D and a continuum of identical price-taking informed
traders I = [0, 1].7 Their preference parameters are the rate of absolute risk aversion θi,
i = D, I and the common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). They trade a single risky asset xt with
risky dividend dt+1 and a risk-free bond yt with gross interest rate R. The total supply of
the risky asset is x¯, and the supply of the risk-free asset is inelastic so that R is exogenously
given. Each agent i = D, I has a private investment opportunity sit, generating a risky











into profit piit, investment in the risk-free bond yt and investment in the risky asset ptx
i
t.




















where mit is the amount of money at the beginning of period t that is independent of the
period t price.
To define the equilibrium, we need to specify the information set of each agent. As in the
baseline model, the informed traders receive a noisy signal about the dividend zt = dt+1+t+1.
The information set for the informed traders F It =
{







the past prices, asset holdings, dividends, private investment opportunities and signals. Gi-
ven the prices (pt, R) and the information F It , the informed traders submit the demand sche-








where the notation emphasizes that the demand schedule is a noisy
7Since both the dealer and the traders have private shocks, we do not need to introduce uninformed
traders to prevent full information revelation.
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signal about zt. The information set for the dealer FDt =
{



















so that the dealer extracts information about the
signal zt. The dealer quotes price optimally knowing that her inventory is determined by
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, denoted by the 3× 3 matrix Σ3×3, generates reasons to
trade, and the i.i.d. assumption suffices to yield AR(1) equilibrium asset holdings as stated
in proposition 3.3.
The equilibrium is defined as follows. Let Eit be the expectation operator conditional on
the σ-algebra generated by F it , i = D, I .





is an equilibrium if the
following conditions are satisfied.


























































Note that this equilibrium shares the same spirit as the baseline model; the dealer is a
demand taker and the traders are price takers. In this sense, the price and the demand are
best responses to each other.
The main difference is that since the problem is dynamic, the risky asset purchase of the
last period is directly tied to the current period risky inventory. Therefore, both agents can
control their inventory shocks as opposed to the baseline model.
3.3.2 Characterization of equilibrium
This section characterizes the affine equilibrium and shows that the dynamic model has a
well-defined steady state distribution of the risky asset holdings.
Fix the following sixteen exogenous parameters
{
β,R, θI , θD, x¯, d¯, d¯
I , d¯D, σ2d, σ
2



























































since it does not affect individual optimization, and
therefore equilibrium objects.
102




, i.e., for some constants of price
A0, Ax, B, C = [CI , CD]
′ and constants of risky asset holdings (ρ0, ρ1), the equilibrium has
the form of
pt = A0 + Axx
D
t−1 +B (zt + C


















where Dt is a function of current shocks (zt, st).
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
This proposition satisfies our motivation to introduce dynamics; if |ρ1| < 1, we can obtain
the average asset holding
ExD :=
ρ0
1− ρ1 . (3.22)
Another observation is that the equilibrium has the state-space representation where Eq.(3.21)
is the state equation and Eq.(3.20) is the observation. The reason for which the equilibrium
objects are persistent despite the i.i.d. shock assumption is the inventory management. The
transaction of the last period on the risky asset affects the amount of risks to begin with in
the current period, which then affects the transaction in the current period.
With the affine equilibrium structure, we can conduct an analogous policy analysis as
the baseline model.
3.3.3 Policy analysis
As in the baseline model, we focus on the comparative statics of equilibrium objects with
respect to the effective risk aversion θD ∈ (0,∞). The interpretation of the thought expe-
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riment is as follows. Suppose the economy is in the steady state. If suddenly the dealer
regulation is introduced, what will happen to the price quality and welfare? In particular,
we note that our welfare analysis takes into account the transitional dynamics, not just the
comparison of the steady states before and after the policy intervention.
Let us formalize the equilibrium objects of interest. The price informativeness is defi-
ned as |CD|−1 which reflects how much the information that the dealer extracts from the










where the asset holding is the steady state value derived in Eq. (3.22)
when θD = θI , denoted by xD−1 = Ex
D (θI = θD), and the initial money is set to be mI0 = 0
without loss of generality. For the welfare of the dealer, we see the path of expected pro-
fit t 7→ E [piDt |xD−1,mD0 ], again with xD−1 = ExD (θI = θD) and mD0 = 0. Fig.3.2 shows a
numerical example where the parameter values are specified in the caption.
What is different from the baseline model is the declining price volatility, which increases
according to the conventional wisdom. The logic of decreasing price volatility can be under-
stood from observing panel f. As the dealer becomes more risk averse, the dealer reduces
the risky asset holding. Since the absolute amount of risk in her inventory decreases, she
does not have to fluctuate price as much as in the baseline model where the inventory risks
from the endowments are exogenously fixed. In other words, since in the dynamic model the
inventory risks can be endogenously chosen to be small by reducing the risky asset holding,
there is less need to make price fluctuate.
All other results in the baseline model including the welfare implications survive in this
dynamic setting. Price informativeness deteriorates, the welfare of the traders improve and
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sD = 1, σddI = σddD = .5 and x¯ = 200 so that the steady state asset holdings are
positive for both the dealer and the traders. All the x axes except for panel d are θD. The x axis
for panel d is time t. Panel a shows that the price informativeness deteriorates as a result of dealer
regulation from the steady state. Panel b and c show that price volatility decreases as opposed to
Fig.3.1. Panel c shows that the traders' welfare improves. Panel d shows that the expected profit of
the dealer declines at each time horizon. Panel f shows that as the dealer becomes more risk averse,
the steady state asset holding for the dealer decreases.
the welfare of the dealer decreases. In particular, the expected profit for the dealer decreases
not just in the sense of the discounted sum, but also at each future period.
In summary, we observe that the welfare results in the baseline model are robust, but
the increase in price volatility is flipped by introducing dynamics, suggesting the fragility of
the conventional wisdom.
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3.4 Endogenous information acquisition
The section shows that the welfare results of the baseline model survive even when infor-
mation acquisition is endogenized. We also show that the decreasing price informativeness,
derived in the baseline model as a description of the conventional wisdom, does not survive.
3.4.1 Definition of equilibrium
To endogenize the information acquisition, we construct a simple two-period model, in which
the insiders choose κ in the first period, and all players play the baseline model in the second
period. Hence, we use the same notation as the baseline model. Let uI (κ) be the equilibrium
ex-ante utility of the insiders in the baseline model, viewed as a function of the precision of
the signal κ.
Definition 3.4. Fix exogenous parameters
{
θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, λ
}
. A set of signal precision,
price and demand functions
{
κ∗ , p (z, s) , x
B
I (z, p) , x
B
O (p) , x
B (z, p)
}
is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if
1. κ∗ maximizes uI (κ).
2. Given
{






p (z, s) , xBI (z, p) , x
B




librium in the baseline model.
This definition describes the best case scenario for the insiders in the sense that the
insiders are allowed to take the social planner's point of view, understanding all the general
equilibrium effects in the second period when they optimize the signal precision κ in the
first period.
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A natural concern about this equilibrium concept is whether the equilibrium precision
κ∗ ≥ 0 is an interior solution or not. In the current setting, there is a natural trade-off that
keeps κ∗ interior. As the precision of the signal κ increases, the insiders are more certain
about the distribution of the return d. This partial equilibrium effect has a positive influence
on the ex-ante utility of the risk averse insiders. In contrast, an increase in κ also informs
the dealer of a more precise signal z in equilibrium, which reduces the dealer's inventory risk
and therefore allows her to exert her monopolistic power more confidently. This reduces the
insiders' welfare. Put differently, a better signal decreases the conditional variance V [d|z] in
Eq.(3.14), affecting the dealer's pricing decision in the same way as a decrease in θD. The
resulting higher price then adversely affects the insiders' welfare. Given this trade-off, we
can numerically solve the interior solution κ∗ > 0 for each θD without introducing specific
information cost such as rational inattention a la Sims [2010] or hiring analysts.
Another observation is that this definition abstracts from strategic interactions among the
insiders. One can micro-found the first stage optimization as an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that the highest precision chosen among all the insiders becomes the precision of the
signal observed in the second period. When other insiders choose the precision κ∗ , choosing
κ∗ is optimal. One can also introduce an infinitesimal cost of information acquisition to this
micro-foundation. In this case, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is that one agent
chooses κ∗ and all others free-ride. Since the motivation behind the exercise is not to micro-
found information acquisition, but to see if the baseline results are robust to information
acquisition, we simplify the strategic interactions by focusing on the efficient information
acquisition that maximizes the insiders' welfare.
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Figure 3.3: Endogenous information acquisition (EIA). All the x axes are θD. Parameter values
are set to be κd = κs = θ = s¯ = 1, d¯ = 1.1, and λ = 0.1. For the purpose of comparison, we plot
the same objects in the baseline model when κ = 1. All but the price informativeness show the
same comparative statics results as the baseline model.
3.4.2 Results and discussion
The same four equilibrium objects as the baseline model are of interest, i.e., price informa-
tiveness Q, price volatility V (p (z, s)), the welfare of the traders {uI , uO}, and the welfare
of the dealer uD. The only difference from the baseline model is that κ is a function of θD
since κ is a choice variable. Fig.3.3 summarizes the numerical findings.
The most salient contrast with the baseline model is the improving price informativeness,
which shows that the insiders have a stronger incentive to pump more information into the
market as the dealer becomes more risk averse. The intuition behind this result is that as
the dealer becomes more obsessed with her inventory, the insiders can raise the precision
of the signal to enjoy the partial equilibrium effect without being exploited by the dealer's
monopolistic power. The fact that the price informativeness increases once the insiders'
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information acquisition is endogenized suggests that the effect of dealer regulation on price
informativeness could potentially go either way, as opposed to what the conventional wisdom
suggests.
Other panels follow the same patterns as in the baseline model, including the welfare
redistribution from the dealer to the traders. In particular, the policy analysis indicates the
robustness of the welfare results in the baseline model.
3.5 Final Remarks
We have analyzed the effects of dealer regulation on the properties of price and the resulting
welfare consequences. The baseline model shows that the price quality deterioration can
coexist with the welfare improvement of other market participants than the dealer. The
two extensions then demonstrates the robustness of the novel welfare implications as well
as the fragility of the conventional wisdom on the price quality deterioration. We are going
to conclude the paper by describing other important aspects of dealer regulation that this
paper does not address.
In this paper, we have limited our scope to the intensive margin of dealer regulation.
However, considering extensive margin is also imperative for a comprehensive assessment
of the Volcker rule. Although Kelleher et al. [2016] reports that the migration has not
happened due to the efforts by the incumbent dealers to discourage entrance, as emphasized
in Duffie [2012], a potential migration of market making to the outside of the regulated
bank sector might have unpredictable and potentially important adverse consequences for
financial stability. See Whitehead [2011] for more discussion.
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Although we have described welfare implication for the intensive margin in a stylized
model, a quantitative assessment requires a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Challenges
for a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the Volcker rule includes an identification stra-
tegy to filter out confounding factors, constructing a counter-factual of a rare event in which
the Volcker rule mitigates a financial crisis, quantifying the benefit of reducing the dealers'
conflicts of interests, evaluating the cost of losing the competitiveness of U.S. banking en-
tities as dealers, and other important issues listed in the Final Rule. These are the points




S. Rao Aiyagari. Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving. Quar-




Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson. Dealership market: Market-making with inventory.
Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1):3153, March 1980. ISSN 0304-405X. doi: 10.1016/
0304-405X(80)90020-3. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
0304405X80900203.
Sakai Ando and Misaki Matsumura. Constrained Efficiency of Competitive Entrepreneurship.
Working paper, 2017.
George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan. Efficient Use of Information and Social




Andrew G. Atkeson, Andrea L. Eisfeldt, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. Entry and Exit in
OTC Derivatives Markets. Econometrica, 83(6):22312292, November 2015. ISSN 1468-
0262. doi: 10.3982/ECTA11477. URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.
cul.columbia.edu/doi/10.3982/ECTA11477/abstract.
Tyler Biggs. Is Small Beautiful and Worthy of Subsidy? Literature Review. 2003.
Saki Bigio and Jennifer LaO. Financial Frictions in Production Networks. Working Paper
22212, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2016. URL http://www.nber.org/
papers/w22212. DOI: 10.3386/w22212.
Radim Bohacek and Jozef Zubricky. A Flat Tax Reform in an Economy with Occupati-
onal Choice and Financial Frictions. The Economic Journal, 122(565):13131345, De-
cember 2012. ISSN 1468-0297. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02527.x. URL http:
//onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02527.x/abstract.
Alex Boulatov, Albert Kyle, and Dmitry Livdan. Uniquenss of Equilibrium in the Single-
Period Kyle'85 Model. Working paper. Maryland University., October 2012.
Bradyn Breon-Drish. On Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in a Class of Noisy
Rational Expectations Models. The Review of Economic Studies, page rdv012, March
2015. ISSN 0034-6527, 1467-937X. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdv012. URL http://restud.
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/03/15/restud.rdv012.
William A Brock and Leonard J Mirman. Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: The
discounted case. Journal of Economic Theory, 4(3):479513, June 1972. ISSN 0022-0531.
112
doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(72)90135-4. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/0022053172901354.
Francisco J. Buera and Yongseok Shin. Financial Frictions and the Persistence of History: A
Quantitative Exploration. Journal of Political Economy, 121(2):221272, April 2013. ISSN
0022-3808. doi: 10.1086/670271. URL http://www.journals.uchicago.edu.ezproxy.
cul.columbia.edu/doi/10.1086/670271.
Francisco J. Buera, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Yongseok Shin. Finance and Development: A
Tale of Two Sectors. The American Economic Review, 101(5):19642002, 2011. ISSN
0002-8282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/23045628.
Francisco J. Buera, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Yongseok Shin. Entrepreneurship and Financial
Frictions: A Macrodevelopment Perspective. Annual Review of Economics, 7(1):409436,
2015. doi: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115348. URL https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-economics-080614-115348.
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi. Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth.
American Economic Review, 99(1):85111, March 2009. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/
aer.99.1.85. URL https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.85.
Eduardo Davila and Anton Korinek. Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Fi-
nancial Frictions. The Review of Economic Studies, 2017. doi: 10.1093/restud/
rdx010. URL https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/doi/10.1093/restud/
rdx010/2982065/Pecuniary-Externalities-in-Economies-with.
Julio Davila, Jay H. Hong, Per Krusell, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull. Constrained Ef-
113
ficiency in the Neoclassical Growth Model With Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Shocks.
Econometrica, 80(6):24312467, November 2012. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.3982/
ECTA5989. URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/
doi/10.3982/ECTA5989/abstract.
Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3):401419, 1983. ISSN 0022-3808. URL http://www.
jstor.org/stable/1837095.
Peter A. Diamond. The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model with
Technological Uncertainty. The American Economic Review, 57(4):759776, 1967. ISSN
0002-8282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1815367.
Darrell Duffie. Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule, January 2012. URL
http://www.darrellduffie.com/.
Larry G. Epstein and Stanley E. Zin. Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior
of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework. Econometrica, 57(4):937
969, 1989. ISSN 0012-9682. doi: 10.2307/1913778. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
1913778.
David S. Evans and Boyan Jovanovic. An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under
Liquidity Constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4):808827, 1989. ISSN 0022-3808.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1832192.
Emmanuel Farhi, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski. A Theory of Liquidity and Regula-
114
tion of Financial Intermediation. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(3):973992, 2009.
ISSN 0034-6527. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/40247629.
Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge, and John Van Reenen. Firm Size Distortions and the
Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France. American Economic Review, 106
(11):34393479, November 2016. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20130232. URL
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20130232.
J. Geanakoplos, M. Magill, M. Quinzii, and J. DrÃ²ze. Generic inefficiency of stock market
equilibrium when markets are incomplete. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 19(1):
113151, January 1990. ISSN 0304-4068. doi: 10.1016/0304-4068(90)90039-C. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/030440689090039C.
John Geanakoplos and Heraklis Polemarchakis. Existence, regularity, and constrained
suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete. Un-




Douglas Gollin. Nobody's business but my own: Self-employment and small enterprise in
economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(2):219233, March 2008. ISSN
0304-3932. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.11.003. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0304393207001493.
115
Roger H. Gordon and Sarada. How Should Taxes Be Designed to Encourage Entrepreneurs-
hip? January 2017. URL https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896431.
Piero Gottardi, Atsushi Kajii, and Tomoyuki Nakajima. Constrained Inefficiency and Op-
timal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(1):128,
February 2016. ISSN 1467-9779. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12135. URL http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.12135/abstract.
Joshua D. Gottlieb, Richard R. Townsend, and Ting Xu. Does Career Risk Deter Potential
Entrepreneurs? June 2017. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2714577. URL https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2714577.
FranÃois Gourio and Nicolas Roys. Size-dependent regulations, firm size distribution,
and reallocation. Quantitative Economics, 5(2):377416, July 2014. ISSN 1759-7331.
doi: 10.3982/QE338. URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.
edu/doi/10.3982/QE338/abstract.
Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Externalities in Economies with Imperfect
Information and Incomplete Markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2):229
264, 1986. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.2307/1891114. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
1891114.
Sanford J. Grossman and Merton H. Miller. Liquidity and Market Structure. The Journal
of Finance, 43(3):617633, July 1988. ISSN 0022-1082. doi: 10.2307/2328186. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328186.
Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz. On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
116
Markets. The American Economic Review, 70(3):393408, June 1980. ISSN 0002-8282.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805228.
Nezih Guner, Gustavo Ventura, and Yi Xu. Macroeconomic implications of size-dependent
policies. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4):721744, October 2008. ISSN 1094-
2025. doi: 10.1016/j.red.2008.01.005. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1094202508000070.
Barton H. Hamilton. Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Returns to
Self-Employment. Journal of Political Economy, 108(3):604631, June 2000. ISSN 0022-
3808. doi: 10.1086/262131. URL http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/citedby/
10.1086/262131.
Oliver Hansch, Narayan Y. Naik, and S. Viswanathan. Do Inventories Matter in Dealership
Markets? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange. The Journal of Finance, 53(5):1623
1656, October 1998. ISSN 0022-1082. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/117419.
Peter Henning. Don't Expect Eye-Popping Fines for Volcker Rule Violations. The
New York Times, December 2013. URL http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/
dont-expect-eye-popping-fines-for-volcker-rule-violations/.
Jack Hirshleifer. The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity. The American Economic Review, 61(4):561574, September 1971. ISSN 0002-
8282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1811850.
Thomas S. Y. Ho and Hans R. Stoll. The Dynamics of Dealer Markets under Compe-





Johan Hombert, Antoinette Schoar, David Sraer, and David Thesmar. Can Unemployment
Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Technical Report w20717, National Bureau of
Economic Research, November 2014. URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w20717.
Hugo A. Hopenhayn. Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium. Eco-
nometrica, 60(5):11271150, 1992. ISSN 0012-9682. doi: 10.2307/2951541. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951541.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter J. Klenow. Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China
and India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4):14031448, November 2009.
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403. URL http://qje.
oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1403.
Chang-Tai Hsieh, Erik Hurst, Charles I. Jones, and Peter J. Klenow. The Allocation of Talent
and U.S. Economic Growth. Technical Report w18693, National Bureau of Economic
Research, January 2013. URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w18693.
Erik Hurst and Benjamin Wild Pugsley. What Do Small Businesses Do? Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, page 73, September 2011. ISSN 0007-2303. URL https://www.
questia.com/library/journal/1G1-289721592/what-do-small-businesses-do.
Roberto Fattal Jaef. Constrained Optimality and the Welfare Effects of Misallocation. 2012
Meeting Papers, 2012. URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed012/1103.html.
118
S. M. Kanbur. Impatience, Information and Risk Taking in a General Equilibrium Model
of Occupational Choice. The Review of Economic Studies, 46(4):707718, 1979a. ISSN
0034-6527. doi: 10.2307/2297037. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297037.
S. M. Kanbur. Of Risk Taking and the Personal Distribution of Income. Jour-





S. M. Kanbur. Risk taking and taxation. Journal of Public Economics, 15(2):163184,
April 1981. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90031-1. URL http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047272781900311.
S. M. Ravi Kanbur. Entrepreneurial Risk Taking, Inequality, and Public Policy: An
Application of Inequality Decomposition Analysis to the General Equilibrium Effects of





Louis Kaplow. Optimal Regulation with Exemptions. Working Paper 23887, National Bureau
119
of Economic Research, September 2017. URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w23887.
DOI: 10.3386/w23887.
Dennis Kelleher, Caitlin Kline, and Victoria Daka. Stopping Wall Street's Derivatives Dealers
Club: Why The CFTC Must Act Now To Prevent Attempts To Undermine Derivatives
Trading Reforms That Threaten Systematic Stability and Harm Consumers, February
2016. URL https://www.bettermarkets.com/keywords/stopping-wall-street%E2%
80%99s-derivatives-dealers-club.
Richard E. Kihlstrom and Jean-Jacques Laffont. A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial
Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion. Journal of Political Economy, 87(4):
719748, 1979. ISSN 0022-3808. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831005.
Sagiri Kitao. Entrepreneurship, taxation and capital investment. Review of Economic Dyn-
amics, 11(1):4469, January 2008. ISSN 1094-2025. doi: 10.1016/j.red.2007.05.002. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202507000269.
Tom Krebs. Human Capital Risk and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118(2):709744, May 2003. ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650. doi: 10.1162/
003355303321675491. URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/118/2/709.
David M. Kreps and Evan L. Porteus. Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic
Choice Theory. Econometrica, 46(1):185200, 1978. ISSN 0012-9682. doi: 10.2307/
1913656. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913656.
Albert S. Kyle. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica (pre-1986), 53(6):
120
1315, November 1985. ISSN 00129682. URL http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.
cul.columbia.edu/docview/214676044/abstract?
Ross Levine and Yona Rubinstein. Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do
They Earn More? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2):9631018, May 2017. ISSN
0033-5533. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjw044. URL https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/
132/2/963/2724553.
Hong Liu and Yajun Wang. Market making with asymmetric information and inventory
risk. Journal of Economic Theory, 163:73109, May 2016. ISSN 0022-0531. doi: 10.
1016/j.jet.2016.01.005. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0022053116000065.
Robert E. Lucas. On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. The Bell Journal of Economics,
9(2):508523, 1978. ISSN 0361-915X. doi: 10.2307/3003596. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/3003596.
N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D. Whinston. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 17(1):4858, 1986. ISSN 0741-6261. doi: 10.2307/2555627.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555627.
Gustavo Manso. Experimentation and the Returns to Entrepreneurship. The Re-
view of Financial Studies, 29(9):23192340, September 2016. ISSN 0893-9454.
doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhw019. URL https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/29/9/2319/
2583665/Experimentation-and-the-Returns-to.
Cesaire A. Meh. Business risk, credit constraints, and corporate taxation. Journal of Econo-
121
mic Dynamics and Control, 32(9):29713008, September 2008. ISSN 0165-1889. doi:
10.1016/j.jedc.2007.10.007. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0165188907002515.
J. A. Mirrlees. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. The Review
of Economic Studies, 38(2):175208, 1971. ISSN 0034-6527. doi: 10.2307/2296779. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2296779.
Tobias J. Moskowitz and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. The Returns to Entrepreneurial In-
vestment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle? The American Economic Review, 92(4):
745778, 2002. ISSN 0002-8282. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083280.
Domotor Palvolgyi and Gyuri Venter. Multiple Equilibria in Noisy Rational Expectations
Economies. Working paper. Copenhagen Business School., February 2015. doi: 10.2139/
ssrn.2524105. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2524105.
Markus Poschke. The Firm Size Distribution Across Countries and Skill-Biased Change
in Entrepreneurial Technology. Working paper, 2017. URL https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2403128.
Vincenzo Quadrini. Entrepreneurship in macroeconomics. Annals of Finance, 5(3-4):295
311, September 2008. ISSN 1614-2446, 1614-2454. doi: 10.1007/s10436-008-0105-7. URL
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10436-008-0105-7.
Diego Restuccia and Richard Rogerson. Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with
heterogeneous establishments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4):707720, October
122
2008. ISSN 1094-2025. doi: 10.1016/j.red.2008.05.002. URL http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S1094202508000203.
Ananth Seshadri and Nicolas Roys. Economic Development and the Organization of Pro-
duction. Working paper, 2014. URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed012/456.
html.
Scott Shane. Why encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is bad public policy.
Small Business Economics, 33(2):141149, August 2009. ISSN 0921-898X, 1573-0913.
doi: 10.1007/s11187-009-9215-5. URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s11187-009-9215-5.
Scott A. Shane. The Illusions of Entrepreneurship : The Costly Myths That Entrepreneurs,
Investors, and Policy Makers Live By. Yale University Press, New Haven, US, 2008.
ISBN 978-0-300-15006-3. URL http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.
action?docID=10579373.
Christopher A. Sims. Chapter 4 - Rational Inattention and Monetary Economics. In Benja-
min M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, editor, Handbook of Monetary Economics, vo-
lume 3, pages 155181. Elsevier, 2010. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/B9780444532381000041.
Kotaro Suzumura and Kazuharu Kiyono. Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare. The Review
of Economic Studies, 54(1):157167, January 1987. ISSN 0034-6527, 1467-937X. doi:
10.2307/2297451. URL http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/54/1/157.
Alexis Akira Toda. Asset prices and efficiency in a Krebs economy. Review of Economic
123
Dynamics, 18(4):957978, October 2015. ISSN 1094-2025. doi: 10.1016/j.red.2014.11.003.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202514000738.
Francesco Trebbi and Kairong Xiao. Regulation and Market Liquidity. Working Paper
21739, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2015. URL http://www.nber.
org/papers/w21739.
Jack L. Treynor. The Economics of the Dealer Function. Financial Analysts Journal, 43(6):
2734, November 1987. ISSN 0015-198X. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/4479073.
Harald Uhlig. A Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies. Economic Theory, 8(1):4150,
1996. ISSN 0938-2259. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054951.
Galina Vereshchagina and Hugo A. Hopenhayn. Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs. American
Economic Review, 99(5):180830, December 2009. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.99.
5.1808. URL https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.5.1808.
Xavier Vives. Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock, February 2010. ISBN 978-0-691-
14596-9.
Paul Volcker. How to Reform Our Financial System. The New York Times, Janu-
ary 2010. ISSN 0362-4331. URL http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/
31volcker.html.
Jiang Wang. A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume. Journal of Political Economy,
102(1):127168, 1994. ISSN 0022-3808. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138796.
124
Charles K. Whitehead. The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets. Harvard Business





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs of propositions
I use the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. (Jensen's inequality) Suppose X > 0 is a random variable with positive vari-





Proof. Since CRRA utility function is strictly concave and increasing when γ > 0, Jensen's
inequality and taking inverse function imply
Eu (X) < u (EX)⇔ u−1 (Eu (X)) < EX ⇔ (EX1−γ) 11−γ < EX.
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A.1.1 Proof of proposition 1.2
The planner's solution φP maximizes the output.








n (z) |s ≥ G−1s (1− φ)
]
= 1.
Reformulate the problem using s¯ gives
Y (s¯, n) = max
s¯,n(z)≥0
∫
zf (n (z)) 1s≥s¯dG s.t.
∫
n (z) 1s≥s¯dG = Gs (s¯) .




zf (n (z)) g (z|s ≥ s¯) dz s.t.
∫
n (z) g (z|s ≥ s¯) dz = Gs (s¯)
1−Gs (s¯) .
The objective function is a weighted sum of the strictly concave function of {n (z)}z and the
constraint is a linear function of {n (z)}z. Hence, the unique solution is characterized by the
first order conditions.
Furthermore, let smin, smax ∈ [−∞,∞] be the smallest and largest values that the signal
can take, so that 1s≥smin = 1 and 1s≥smax = 0 for all realizations. When s¯ = smin, the value
is Y (smin, n) = 0 since the only feasible employment schedule is n (z) = 0 for all z. When
s¯ = smax, Y (smax, n) = 0 since the objective function is 0. Since 0 output is the lower bound
Y ≥ 0, the solution s¯ is not at the boundaries. Therefore, the solution exists and is unique
if there is a unique set of (s¯, n) that solves the first order conditions.
128
The first order condition can be obtained by taking the derivative of the Lagrangian.






, λ > 0.
E [zf (n (z)) |s = s¯] = λ (1 + E [n (z) |s = s¯])
E [n (z) 1s≥s¯] = Gs (s¯)
Combining the conditions gives









))− λ (f ′)−1 (λ
z
) |s = s¯]− λ = 0.








]−Gs (s¯) = 0
Note that the integrand of F1 is identical to the value function of the profit maximization
















Thus, F1 gives a strictly positive relationship between s¯ and λ. In contrast, F2 gives a strictly
negative relationship. Hence, there is a unique solution (s¯, n) to the output maximization
problem, and unique solution φP to the original problem.
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A.1.2 Proof of proposition 1.3
For the first statement, when there are no risks, the laissez-faire economy is characterized
by
(









































u′(wLF ) z ≤ z¯
1
u′(pi(z,wLF )) z > z¯
I show that (z¯, w, pi, n) is the solution to the planner's problem. Without loss of genrality,




λ (z)u (c (z)) dGz s.t.

∫
c (z) dGz = Y
Y = E [zf (n (z)) 1z≥z¯]





λ (z)u (c (z)) dGz + µ {E [zf (n (z)) 1z≥z¯]− Ec (z) + ν (Gz (z¯)− E [n (z) 1z≥z¯])}
The FOCs are 
Lc = 0 ⇒ u′ (c (z)) = µλ(z)
Ln = 0 ⇒ zf ′ (n (z)) = ν
Lz¯ = 0 ⇒ z¯f (n (z¯))− vn (z¯) = ν
(µ, z¯, v, n) =
(
1, z¯LF , w, nLF
)




1z≥z¯LF + w1z<z¯LF satisfies the equili-
brium conditions.
For the second statement it suffices to show that the laissez-faire economy does not































zf (n (z)) 1s≥s¯dG s.t.
∫
n (z) 1s≥s¯dG = Gs (s¯) ,
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= Gs (s¯) .
Note that the two systems are different by u. Therefore, the laissez-faire economy can Pareto
improve by producing more and redistribute them.





























































so from the market clearing condition, λ and s¯ have to be negatively correlated. Hence,
w < λ and s¯P < s¯LF , which then implies φLF < φP .
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A.1.3 Proof of proposition 1.4
First, I reformulate the optimal taxation problem into a mechanism design problem of choo-





Eu (zf (C (z))− wC (z)− Y (z)) = u (w)
U (C (z) , Y (z) , z) ≥ U (C (z′) , Y (z′) , z) ∀z, z′
EY (z)− T (1 + En (z)) = 0.
(A.1)
The feasible sets of (1.20) and (A.1) are identical. To see this, fix w and choose a feasible
solution (n (z) , T (n)) from (1.20). Then, (C (z) , Y (z)) = (n (z) , T (n (z))) satisfy
U (C, Y, z) := zf (C)− wC − Y
U (C (z) , Y (z) , z) ≥ U (C (z′) , Y (z′) , z) ∀z, z′
To see this, pick arbitrary z and z′ ∈ [zmin, zmax]. Then,
zf (C (z))− wC (z)− Y (z) =zf (n (z))− wn (z)− T (n (z))
≥zf (n (z′))− wn (z′)− T (n (z′))
=zf (C (z′))− wC (z′)− Y (z′) .
The opposite is also true. Given a (C (z) , Y (z)) that satisfies the truth-telling condition
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(A.1), the SDP can be constructed by
T (n) = inf
T¯
{
Y¯ : U (C (z) , Y (z) , z) ≥ U (n, Y¯ , z) ∀z} .
By the truth-telling condition,
U (C (z) , Y (z) , z) = U (C (z) , T (C (z)) , z) ≥ U (n, T (n) , z)∀z, n.
Hence, agents facing T (·) chooses n (z) = C (z).
Next, I reformulate the truth-telling condition into the envelope condition and the mo-
notonicity constraint. Note that the utility function U (C, Y, z) satisfies Spence-Mirrlees
condition




zf ′ (C)− w, MRSz = −
f ′ (C)
(zf ′ (C)− w)2 < 0.
Hence, the truth-telling condition is equivalent to
pi (z) := U (C (z) , Y (z) , z)
pi′ (z) = Uz (C (z) , Y (z) , z) , C ′ (z) ≥ 0
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Eu (pi (z))− u (w) = 0
pi′ (z) = f (n (z))
n′ (z) ≥ 0
E [zf (n (z))− wn (z)− pi (z)]− T (1 + En (z)) = 0.
(A.2)
A.1.4 Proof of proposition 1.5
To solve (A.2) using optimal control theorey, rewrite the integral constraints by
B′ (z) = {zf (n (z))− wn (z)− pi (z)− T (1 + n (z))} g (z) , B (zmin) = B (zmax) = 0.
I ′ (z) = (u (pi (z))− u (w)) g (z) , I (zmin) = I (zmax) = 0.
Wage is constant, so w′ (z) = 0. Monotonicity constraint becomes n′ (z) = L (z) ≥ 0. The
only control variable is L, state variables are pi,w,B, I, n, and the costate variables are
µpi, µw, µB, µI , µn. Hamiltonian is
H = wg (z) + µpif (n) + µw × 0 + µnL+ κL
+ µB {zf (n)− wn− pi − T (1 + n)} g (z) + µI (u (pi)− u (w)) g (z)
HL = 0 = µn + κ
Hpi = −µ′pi = (−µB + µIu′ (pi)) g (z)
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Hw = −µ′w = (1− µBn− µIu′ (w)) g (z)
HB = −µ′B = 0
HI = −µ′I = 0
Hn = −µn′ = µpif ′ (n) + µB {zf ′ (n)− w − T } g (z)
κL = 0, κ ≥ 0, L ≥ 0.
Boundary conditions are
B (zmin) = B (zmax) = I (zmin) = I (zmax) = µpi (zmin) = µpi (zmax)
= µw (zmin) = µw (zmax) = µn (zmin) = µn (zmax) = 0
By reducing the system, the solution (pi,w, µB, µI , µpi, µw, I, B, n, µn) satisfy
pi′ = f (n)
w′ = µ′B = µ
′
I = 0
µ′pi = (µB − µIu′ (pi)) g (z)
µ′w = (µBn+ µIu
′ (w)− 1) g (z)
B′ (z) = {zf (n (z))− wn (z)− pi (z)− T (1 + n (z))} g (z)
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I ′ (z) = (u (pi (z))− u (w)) g (z)
µ′n = −µpif ′ (n)− µB {zf ′ (n)− w − T } g (z)
B (zmin) = B (zmax) = I (zmin) = I (zmax) = µpi (zmin) = µpi (zmax)
= µw (zmin) = µw (zmax) = µn (zmin) = µn (zmax) = 0
µnn
′ = 0, µn ≤ 0, n′ ≥ 0.
By assumption, n′ > 0. Then, from µ′n = 0, n (z) is determined by






In this case, ODE reduced to y = (pi,w, µB, µI , µpi, µw, B, I) such that
pi′ = f (n)
w′ = µ′B = µ
′
I = 0
µ′pi = (µB − µIu′ (pi)) g (z)
µ′w = (µIu
′ (w) + µBn− 1) g (z)
B′ (z) = {zf (n)− wn− pi − T (1 + n)} g (z)
I ′ (z) = (u (pi)− u (w)) g (z)
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B (zmin) = B (zmax) = I (zmin) = I (zmax) = µpi (zmin) = µpi (zmax) = µw (zmin) = µw (zmax) = 0
To show that the medium-sized firms are distorted, it suffices to show µB > 0 > µpi (z)
due to A.3. To see this, note that from envelope theorem,
∂H
∂T = −µBE (1 + n (z)) .
Since higher tax takes more resources, ∂H




µB − µIEu′ (pi (z)) = 0⇒ µI > 0.
Now, let's focus on µ′pi. which has to cross zero since µpi (zmin) = µpi (zmax) = 0. Since pi
′ > 0,
µpi must be convex,
∂µ′pi (z)
∂z
= −µIu′′ (pi (z))pi′ (z) > 0.
Therefore, µ′pi starts from negative and monotonically cross zeros. Hence, µpi < 0.
The fact that the optimal SDP increases the number of firms follows from the distortion.
Note that when T = 0, the laissez-faire economy T (n) = 0 is a feasible choice for the
government. Therefore, the optimal SDP increases wage wo > wLF . For small T > 0, the
marginal products are higher than the laissez-faire wage






Hence, employment is lower at each productivity level. Since the entrepreneurs and workers
have to add up to one, it implies that the number of firms increases. φo > φLF .
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A.1.5 Proof of proposition 1.6
The equilibrium is characterized by
Eu (pi (z, w)) = u (w)
pi (z, w) = max
n
znα − wn s.t. wn ≤ λznα.
φEn (z, w) = 1− φ
Let λ∗ = min {α, λ}. The firm's problem gives













The indifference condition leads to







The market clearing condition implies that the equilibrium number of firms is
φLF =
1− λ∗








This is a decreasing function of λ∗ satisfying φLF → 1 as λ→ 0. Since the planner does not
face any friction, φP does not depend on λ. Hence, for small λ, φP < φLF .
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A.1.6 Proof of proposition 1.7
I first solve the laissez-faire economy and then derive the efficient allocation.



















The maximization in terms of c and coefficient matching with respect to a gives
c =
1− β





c = (1− βθ) rtaθ
a′ = βθrtaθ
The same structure appears in worker's problem with rt replaced by wt. Since the producti-
vity is i.i.d., the productivity and asset distribution are independent. In the equilibrium
where everyone takes the same strategy eit = φ for all t, the market clearing condition
becomes





















1−αφ = 1− φ (A.4)
so wt and rt is time independent. One can also see the value functions are also time inde-
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pendent and vW does not depend on z.
ln vE (z) = (1− β) ln (1− βθ) + βθ 1− β
1− βθ ln βθ
+
1− β
1− βθ ln r (z, w) + β ln
{
φEvE (z′)1−γ + (1− φ) (vW )1−γ} 11−γ (A.5)
ln vW = (1− β) ln (1− βθ) + βθ 1− β
1− βθ ln βθ
+
1− β
1− βθ lnw + β ln
{
φEvE (z′)1−γ + (1− φ) (vW )1−γ} 11−γ (A.6)























Since the return to capital is
r (z, w) = (1− α)α α1−αw αα−1 z 11−α ,
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the equilibrium wage is







and the number of firms is given by the market clearing condition
φm =
1− α












(Planner) To derive the optimal number of firms, it suffices to consider output maxi-
mization. The problem is recursive, so fix a time period t and the aggregate asset saving
At :=
∫
aitdi. This is an endogenous variable, but for the purpose of deriving the optimal
number of firms, I can take it as given as will be clear. Since the investment function fI
is strictly concave and zit+1 is not observable at t, it is optimal to choose the same saving
across agents.
















nit+1di = (1− φt)ht
Yt+1 = φt
∫
zit+1f (kt−1, nit+1) di
.





















































}1−θ (Ez 11−α)1−α (1− α)θ(1−α) αθαAθt .
Hence, the optimal number of firms is φPt = 1−α. One can see φLFt < φPt iff V (z) > 0 since














⇔ γ + (1− θ) β
1− β > 0,
which is always true under the parameter assumptions.
A.2 Derivation of Eq.(1.12) and (1.13)
Eq.(1.12) can be derived as follows. The key is that marginal product equalization holds in
the laissez-faire economy.
Y = φE [zf (n (z, w))] .
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By taking derivative, noting w = w (T ) and φ = φ (T ) are functions of policies
∂TY = Ezf (n (z, w)) ∂Tφ+ φE [zf ′ (n (z, w)) ∂Tn (z, w)] .
Since the derivative is evaluated at laissez-faire, zf ′ (n (z, w)) = w, and ∂TY becomes
∂TY = Ezf (n (z, w)) ∂Tφ+ wφE [∂Tn (z, w)]
We can simplify the second term by substituting out the derivative of the market clearing
condition
∂TφEn (z, w) + φE [∂Tn (z, w)] = −∂Tφ.
Hence, the marginal impact can be written as
∂TY = ∂TφEzf (n)− w∂Tφ (1 + En) = ∂Tφ (Epi (z, w)− w) .
Note that the derivation does not use the indifference condition Eu (pi (z, w)) = u (w).
Similarly, Eq.(1.13) can be derived as follows. Aggregate output is
Y = E [zf (n (z, w)) 1z≥z¯] .
By taking derivative, noting w = w (T ) and z¯ = z¯ (T ) are functions of policies,
∂TY = E [zf ′ (n (z, w)) 1z≥z¯∂Tn (z, w)]− z¯f (n (z¯, w)) gz (z¯) ∂T z¯.
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Since the derivative is evaluated at laissez-faire, zf ′ (n (z, w)) = w, and ∂TY becomes
∂TY = wE [1z≥z¯∂Tn (z, w)]− z¯f (n (z¯, w)) gz (z¯) ∂T z¯.
We can simplify the first term by substituting out the derivative of the market clearing
condition,
E [1z≥z¯∂Tn (z, w)]− n (z¯, w) g (z¯) ∂T z¯ = g (z¯) ∂T z¯.
Hence, the marginal impact can be written as
∂TY = w (1 + n (z¯, w)) gz (z¯) ∂T z¯ − z¯f (n (z¯, w)) gz (z¯) ∂T z¯
= (pi (z¯, w)− w) (−gz (z¯) ∂T z¯) .
Note that the derivation does not use the indifference condition pi (z¯, w) = w.
A.3 Non-pecuniary SDP
If the SDP is non-pecuniary and does not generate tax revenue, the fair comparison is (1)























zf (n)− wSDPn n ≤ N







and (2) the laissez-faire economy with the same amount of non-distrotionary regulation costs
Eu
(


















where t is chosen to equate the tax revenue in the first economy.
With this specification, the policy implication remains the same.
ln
{
(1− t)wLF}− lnwSDP = −1.27% < 0.
A.4 MLE estimation
The effective tax rates (τ, F ) are estimated from the firm size distribution. Given the labor
demand n (z, w; τ, F ) and the the power law density of productivity z, the model-implied








) ≤ n) follows a broken power law and can
be fit with the empirical firm size distribution using the maximum likelihood method. The
indifference condition (1.8) serves as a constraint that restricts parameter values. The only
difference between the two models is whether the indifference condition reflects entrepreneu-
rial risks or not. I show that the indifference condition plays little part in the estimation of
the effective tax rates.
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Following Garicano et al. [2016], the likelihood function is constructed as follows. Given
the parametric assumptions f (n) = nα, the demand function can be written as






1−α zmin ≤ z ≤ z


















z¯Nα − wN = z¯ ( z¯α
wτ
) α

















Given the density of the productivity gz (z), I can derive the distribution function of ni =
n (zi, w) by using the change of variable.
Gn (x) = P (n ≤ x) =

0 x < nmin
n1−βmin−x1−β
n1−βmin−Tn1−βmax
nmin ≤ x < N
n1−βmin−T n¯1−β
n1−βmin−Tn1−βmax
N ≤ x ≤ n¯
n1−βmin−Tx1−β
n1−βmin−Tn1−βmax
n¯ ≤ x ≤ nmax















1− β = (1− α) (1− βz)
T = τ 1−βz
To reconcile the model in which there are no firms over the region N ≤ n ≤ n¯ with the
actual data (Fig.1.1), the observed firm size distribution is assumed to be generated with
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measurement error, i.e., n˜i = n (zi, w) e−σi , i ∼ N (0, 1). The distribution of n˜i follows
Gn˜ (n˜) =P
(



































































In addition, to utilize the bunching around N and avoid the deviation of the model from the
data at the extremes, the sample {n˜i}i is truncated between n˜min = 10 to n˜max = 10, 000.
Hence, the likelihood function of the parameters θ = (α, nmin, nmax, n¯, β, σ, T ) is





Gn˜ (n˜max; θ)−Gn˜ (n˜min; θ) (A.9)
The parameters are subject to the constraint specified by the indifference condition. Given
the CRRA utility parameterization u (c) = c
1−γ













Note that since the likelihood is based on truncation, the extreme values (nmin, nmax) can-
not be estimated accurately. Garicano et al. [2016] avoids this problem by fixing (α, nmax) =
(.8,∞) and maximizing the likelihood L subject to their version of the indifference condition.
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In this way, the indifference condition can be used to obtain nmin = α1−α , so the problem
becomes unconstrained maximization of the likelihood (A.9) over (n¯, β, σ, T ). Similarly, I
can fix (α, nmax) = (.8, n˜max) and maximize the likelihood (A.9) subject to the indifference
condition (A.10). The estimates under these two methods are listed in the following table.
Table A.1: Comparison
Baseline GLV with Amadeus GLV
β 1.848 1.849 1.8
(0.031) (0.028) (0.054)
n¯ 57.903 57.839 59.271
(0.98) (0.901) (2.051)
τ -1 0.021 0.021 0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
σ 0.1 0.099 0.121
(0.014) (0.013) (0.033)
Number of Firms 62549 62549 41067
The first two columns use the same data from Amadeus 2006. The first column assumes
entrepreneurial risks and the second does not. For the purpose of comparison, the third
column lists the estimates from Garicano et al. [2016] that uses FICUS data.
One can see that the first two columns are almost identical. This is not surprising since the
only difference between the two estimates is the shape of the indifference condition. Although
the indifference condition affects nmin, since the likelihood is truncated, it does not contain
much information for the estimation of (n¯, β, σ, T ). In fact, if there is no observation error
σ = 0, the truncation makes the likelihood estimation with and without entrepreneurial risks
exactly identical. Therefore, in terms of the estimation, the existence of the entrepreneurial
risks dose not matter.
One can also see that the second and the third columns are not that different. Therefore,
Amadeus 2006 is a good approximation of the administrative FICUS data. Hence, even if I
149
use FICUS data to estimate all the model parameters, I will get almost the same values as
Garicano et al. [2016].
A.5 Intermediate signal
In this section, I show one way to introduce intermediate signal. The main finding is that
the efficiency gain might not be monotonic over riskiness.
To study the intermediate signal, I need to take stance on two specifications, the welfare
criterion and the parameterization of the signal structure. For the welfare criterion, since
the model becomes heterogeneous agents whenever there are informative signals, I focus on
the aggregate output instead of focusing on a particular Pareto weight. For the parametric
assumption on the signal, I assume each individual observes
si = 1pi(zi,w)≥ηw, η ∈ [0, 1] . (A.11)
I could choose other often-used signal structures such as log normal, but this signal structure
has several advantages in the current setting.
First, the parameter η has a natural interpretation. Agents who observe si = 1 know that
they can earn at least η% of their salary if they are engaged in entrepreneurship, and vice
versa. The interpretation makes it clear that η = 0 corresponds to full-risk case, and η = 1
to no-risk case from the point of view of occupation choice.1Indeed, when η = 0, the signal
is uninformative, so the equilibrium is characterized by (1.8), while when η = 1, the wage
1Agents still are uncertain about the productivity zi, but they are sure which occupation is better when
η = 1. See the discussion right after definition 1.2.
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and signal threshold satisfying (1.7) is an equilibrium. Therefore, η ∈ [0, 1] is a legitimate
parameter that connects the full-risk and no-risk cases.
Second, the signal structure (A.11) preserves power law. Since the productivity z follows
a power law and the signal gives a truncation
pi (zi, w) ≥ ηw ⇔ zi ≥ z (η, w) ,
the distribution of the productivity conditional on the signal is still a power law. This allows
me to use the same parameter values as in 1.4.1.
Given the signal structure, the equilibrium system depends on η. For small η, there are
plenty of agents observing si = 1, so the equilibrium (w, φ) is determined by
E [u (pi (zi, w)) |si = 1] = u (w) , φE [n (zi, w) |si = 1] = 1− φ, P (si = 1) > φ.
Mathematically, the third condition is slack for small η. As η increases, the third condition
becomes tight, and when it binds, the indifference condition has to be relaxed. Hence, for
large η,
E [u (pi (zi, w)) |si = 1] > u (w) , φE [n (zi, w) |si = 1] = 1− φ, P (si = 1) = φ.
The results are shown in Fig.A.1. For each η, the wage is normalized to wSDP = 1. At
the two extremes, the efficiency gain from removing the SDP is −1.5% and .02%. For low
value of η, neither economy reacts to the increase in η. This is because zmin > 0, so for the
small value of η, the information about the productivity is not informative pi (zmin, w) ≥ ηw.
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Figure A.1: Counterfactual analysis with intermediate signal.
As η crosses some threshold, the output of both economy starts to go up since the average
entrepreneurs are more productive. However, the speed of the output growth might be
different, so the difference might not be monotone. In the current setting, η = 45% is the
threshold above which the laissez-faire economy produces higher output. For different signal
structure, the efficiency gain can be more smooth.
A.6 Constrained efficiency
A.6.1 Constrained efficiency with intermediate signal





E [u (pi (z, w)) |s] dGs +Gs (s¯)u (w) s.t.
∫ ∞
s¯
E [n (z, w) |s] dGs = Gs (s¯) .
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The idea is that the planner's choice set is restricted to the number of firms φ, or equivalently
s¯. All other allocations, such as employment schedule and consumption, are determined by
the market. This is a stronger result of efficiency and follow the spirit of Diamond [1967].
Denote the solution by φCP . By restricting the functional form, a similar result as
unconstrained efficiency can be obtained.
Claim. Fix CRRA utility and Cobb-Douglas production functions (u, f). The laissez-faire
economy generates insufficient number of firms φLF < φCP compared to the constrained
planner iff there are entrepreneurial risks.










































1− γ w (s¯)
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1−α |s ≥ s¯
])1−α




























































































< 0, it suffices to show D (s¯LF , wLF ) > 0. By applying the indifference condition
and the market clearing condition,












































1−α |s = s¯
]

































The second term is smaller than 1 since z 7→ z 1−γ1−α is a decreasing function, so the higher the
signal is the lower the integrand is. When γ ∈ (0, 1), D (s¯LF , wLF ) > 0 still holds. To see
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1−α |s ≥ s¯
]
γ ≤ 1.
Since all I use is Jensen's inequality, φLF = φCP when there are no entrepreneurial risks.
The functional form assumption is necessary. If we relax the assumptions to just u′ > 0 >
u′′, it is possible to find f,G such that φCP < φLF . For the detail, see Ando and Matsumura
[2017].
A.6.2 Constrained efficiency with financial frictions
The constrained planner solves
max
φ,w




pi (z, w) = maxn zn
α − wn s.t. wn ≤ λznα
φEn (z, w) = 1− φ
.
The idea is the same as section A.6.1. The constarined planner can only choose the number
of firms and has to let all other allocations be determined by the market.
Claim. Fix CRRA utility and Cobb-Douglas production functions (u, f) and arbitrary risk
structure Gz with bounded support. If the financial constraints are severe λ ≈ 0, the laissez-
faire economy generates an excessive number of firms φCP < φLF .
By substituting out φ using the market clearing condition and applying an increasing
transformation, the objective function can be written as
U (w) :=
{
φ (w)Epi (z, w)1−γ + (1− φ (w))w1−γ} 11−γ = w{ Epi(z,w)1−γw1−γ + En (z, w)
1 + En (z, w)
} 1
1−γ























1 + En (z, w)
}






= 0. Evaluating the




























Since φLF → 1 as λ → 0, the FOC at w = wLF can be negative. Hence, wLF > wCP . By
the market clearing condition φCP < φLF .
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A.6.3 Constrained efficiency with capital accumulation
The formulation of the constrained efficiency problem inherits the ex-ante view of the planner
in the static model. In particular, I make the following thought experiment. Suppose all
agents are in a symmetric equilibrium in which they face the same lottery and the economy
is in a stationary equilibrium. If, at some period t, a planner shows up and offers a new job
lottery, will everyone prefer it?
Such a thought experiment can be formulated as follows. Let φ = {φt}t be the proba-
bility of becoming entrepreneurs at each period chosen by the constrained planner. This
is the only choice that the planner can control. Other decisions are made by the market,
i.e., each individual i takes φ as given and maximizes the recursive welfare by making con-
sumption/saving decision. Formally, the agent i with the state (a, j, z) = (ait−1, jit−1, zit)
solves
Vt (a, j, z;φ) = max
(c,a′)∈Bt(a,j,z)
u−1I [(1− β)uI (cit) +
βuI
(
u−1 (φtEu (Vt+1 (a′, E, z′;φ)) + (1− φt)Eu (Vt+1 (a′,W, z′;φ)))
)]
(A.12)
Note that the budget set reflects that the production schedule {pi (z, w, k) , n (z, w, k)} is
determined by the market, not by the planner.
Since all the equilibrium objects are functions of the planner's choice φ, the wage process








specifies the mapping from the process of the number of the firms φ to wage w, denoted by
w (φ). I note that this mapping is implicitly included in the value function Vt (a, j, z;φ).
In summary, the constrained planner can be defined as follows. Fix the fundamentals












u−1 (φtEu (Vt (ait, E, zit;φ)) + (1− φt)Eu (Vt (ait,W, ait;φ))) di
subject to {wt} = w (φ).
Claim. Fix CRRA intra-temporal utility, log inter-temporal utility, and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction and asset transformation functions. Then, the laissez-faire economy generates an
insufficient number of firms φLF < φCP .
Proof. The Bellman equations of the constrained planner's problem after maximizing out
consumption-saving decision are the same, i.e., Eq.(A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) all hold. However,
the indifference condition no longer holds. Still, I can derive the constrained planner's
objective function. Note that by (A.7), the value of the next period can be written as
{








By substituting this condition into the worker's Bellman equation (A.6), I can solve the
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worker's value function vE in closed form
ln vW = ln (1− βθ) + βθ

















As a result, the planner maximizes (A.13) subject to (A.14) and the market clearing condition
(A.4). Eq.(A.13) is equivalent to the objective function because the pre-determined asset
distribution and the current productivity are independent ait ⊥ zit and the value functions
are multiplicative with respect to asset Vt (a, j, z) = v
j
t (z) a






















α−1φ = 1− φ
(A.14)
By taking log of the objective function, the FOC is
































= 1 holds in the equilibrium of the laissez-















Hence, φCP R φLF if and only if φLF Q 1−α, which is then equivalent to γ+(1− θ) β
1−β R 0.




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs of propositions
B.1.1 Proof of proposition 2.3
The proof is divided into two parts. The first part shows the concavity of U (φ). The second
part proves φm < φcp.
B.1.1.1 Cancavity of U (φ)
Note that the market clearing condition implies




















Hence, U (φ) can be written as






1−α(1−γ) (1− φ)α(1−γ) + θwφ(1−α)(1−γ) (1− φ)1−(1−α)(1−γ)
}
− 1
where θe > 0 and θw > 0 are independent of φ















Note that, for arbitrary a ∈ R and b ∈ R
d
dφ







= φa−1 (1− φ)b−1 {a (1− φ)− bφ}
d2
dφ2











The curly bracket of U has two such terms, one for (a, b) = (1− α (1− γ) , α (1− γ)) and













1− γ = − (1− α) {α + (1− α) γ} < 0.
Hence, U ′′ (φ) < 0 for all φ ∈ (0, 1) and the problem is strictly concave. To show the existence
and uniqueness, it suffices to show that the first order condition ranges from negative to
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positive. Indeed, it is tedious but straightforward to show the signs of limφ→0 U ′ (φ) and
limφ→1 U ′ (φ) are opposite.
U ′ (φ) =
θe
1− γφ




(1−α)(1−γ)−1 (1− φ)−(1−α)(1−γ) {(1− α) (1− γ)− φ}
If γ > 1, limφ→0 U ′ (φ) =∞ > 0 > −∞ = limφ→1 U ′ (φ). If 0 < γ < 1, limφ→1 U ′ (φ) =∞ >
0 > −∞ = limφ→0 U ′ (φ). Finally, if γ = 1, the utility function becomes log, and

















By using the L'Hospital's rule, limφ→0 U ′ (φ) = ∞ > 0 > −∞ = limφ→1 U ′ (φ). Hence,
(wcp, φcp) ∈ R++ × (0, 1).
B.1.1.2 Proof of φm < φcp
As the discussion after the theorem, the FOC of the planner evaluated at the market allo-
cation is
U ′ (φm) =
(
φm
∂Eu (pi (z, wm))
∂w





By taking derivative of the definition of risk premium,
∂Eu (pi (z, wm))
∂w
















Hence, U ′ (φm) can be written as
U ′ (φm) = −φmu′ (wm)w′ (φm)R′ (wm) .
If (u, f) is CRRA & CD, the indifference condition and market clearing condition lead to
φm :=
1− α








Let's use the risk premium to prove the result,









Epi (z, w) = (1− α)α α1−αw αα−1Ez 11−α












Note that by Jensen's inequality in lemma A.1, the curly bracket term is positive. By taking
derivative of R (w),














Since R′ (w) < 0 for all w, it is also true for w = wm and therefore U ′ (φm) > 0. Combined
with the concavity of U ′ (φ), φm < φcp.
B.1.2 Proof of proposition 2.4.
For the third statement, we fix α ∈ (0, 1) and construct (u,G). Define a strictly concave




1−γ c ≤ 1
c1−ε−1
1−ε c ≥ 1
⇒ u′ (c) =

c−γ c ≤ 1
c− c ≥ 1
, u′′ (c) =

−γc−γ−1 c ≤ 1
−εc−ε−1 c ≥ 1
.
This function satisfies u′ > 0 > u′′ and Inada conditions. We choose G such that the market
equilibrium is wm = 1. In particular, z is Bernoulli taking z1 > 0 with probability p ∈ (0, 1)
and z2 > z1 with probability 1− p where (z1, z2, p) satisfy Eu (pi (z, 1)) = u (1), or
{














1− ε (1− p) = 0.
The risk premium R′ (w) evaluated at w = wm = 1 satisfy
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Let ε→ 0 be arbitrarily close to 0. Then,
R′ (wm) ≈ − αp
1− α
{











Since Eu (pi (z, 1)) = u (1), (1− α)α α1−α z
1
1−α
1 < 1, and thereforeR
′ (wm) > 0 and U ′ (φm) < 0.
The strict concavity of U can be established in the same way as the proof of proposition 2.3
by noting the concavity of each term of the objective function
U (φ) =φ
{
pi (z1, w (φ))
1−ξ1 − 1
1− ξ1 p+
pi (z2, w (φ))
1−ξ2 − 1
1− ξ2 (1− p)
}





















where (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) can take various combinations of values in {γ, ε} depending on φ, and
(θ1, θ2, θ3) are positive constants independent of φ. Hence, φcp < φm follows.
B.2 Heuristic derivation of Eq. (2.18)
For the mathematical proof, see Appendix B.1.1. We describe the intuitive derivation.
Note that the aggregate resources consumed by the entrepreneurs Π (φ) := φEpi (z, w)







φ1−α (1− φ)α (B.1)
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due to the Cobb-Douglas technology
Π (φ) = (1− α)Y (φ) , W (φ) = αY (φ) .
Hence, the welfare function, using the risk premium (2.17), can be written as












By taking derivative and evaluating it at the market equilibrium φ = φm,









Y (φm)−R′ (wm)w′ (φm)
}
Let's interpret the curly bracket term. The first term is the aggregate output increase due
to better occupation allocation Y ′ (φm) > 0. This effect is canceled by the second term,









Y (φ) = 0.
One can see this from Eq. (B.1). 1 Hence, the marginal welfare can be written as
U ′ (φm) = −φmu′ (wm)w′ (φm)R′ (wm) .
1Actually, the result does not depend on Cobb-Douglas specification.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of theorem 3.1
The proof of the theorem is by comparison of coefficients. At the end, the system of coeffi-
cients boils down to a cubic polynomial of β. The second order condition for the dealer then
selects the unique negative root. All other coefficients are uniquely determined once β is
obtained. Since a cubic polynomial equation has a closed form solution, all the equilibrium
coefficients can be written in closed forms.With additional calculations, we can also derive
welfare of agents in closed forms. We first prove existence and uniqueness. BCβIγIβOβγ 6= 0
is assumed until it is proven at the end.
Existence and uniqueness
Proof is by guessing and verifying p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs).
Traders' problem
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By the joint normality of X and p (z, s) = A + B (z + Cs), the moments of return d condi-
tional on the traders' information are
EId = E [d|z] = κdd¯+ κz
κd + κ
VId = V [d|z] = 1
κd + κ
EOd = E [d|z + Cs] = d¯+ κ
−1
d










κ−1d + κ−1 + C2κ−1s
.










Outsider's best response is xBO (p) = αO + βOp where
αO =
(κ−1 + C

















θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
. (C.2)
The total demand is xB (z, p) = α + βp+ γz where
α = λαI + (1− λ)αO, β = λβI + (1− λ) βO, γ = λγI . (C.3)
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Dealer's problem









(s− α− βp− γz)E [d|z] + p (α + βp+ γz)− θD
2
(s− α− βp− γz)2 V [d|z] .
The first order condition with respect to p gives p (z, s) = A+B (z + Cs) where
[A] : A =




θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[B] : B =
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ) (C.4)
[C] : C =
θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ) .
The second order condition is
β
(







θ, θD, d¯, s¯, κd, κs, κ, λ
)
is exogenous. Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium is
equivalent to those of the eleven parameters (αI , βI , γI , αO, βO, α, β, γ, A,B,C) that satisfy
(C.1), (C.2), (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5).
We can reduce this problem to finding a root of the equation that only contains β. To
see this, note that (αI , βI , γI) and therefore γ are already functions of exogenous parameters.
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By substituting (C.2) into (C.3), the problem reduces to finding (α, β,A,B,C) satisfying
[α] : α = λαI + (1− λ)
(κ−1 + C






θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )










θκ−1d (κ−1 + C2κ−1s )
[A] : A =




θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[B] : B =
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ2 − 2β (κd + κ)
[C] : C =
θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
[SOC] : β
(




By substituting [B] and [C] into [β], we can obtain an equation that contains only β. Once β
that satisfies both this equation and [SOC] is obtained, (C,B) can be uniquely determined
by [C] and [B]. (α,A) is then the unique solution of a system of linear equations, [α] and
[A].
Now we show such β exists uniquely. By substituting [B] and [C] into [β],
b (β) := b0 + b1β + b2β
2 + b3β
3 = 0, (C.6)
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where coefficients (b0, b1, b2, b3) are

b0 = γ
2κs (κd + κ)
3
b1 = −κ2κsλ2θ (κd + κ)2
(
1 + 2 θD
θ
)
b2 = κs (κd + κ)
{
(γθD + κ)




D (κd + κ) + κdκθ
2
D (1− λ)
b3 = κsγθθD (γθD + 2κ) + κκsγθ
2
D (1− λ) + κsκ2 {(1− λ) θD + θ}+ κθθ2D
.
b0 = b (0) > 0 and b3 > 0 implies that there is a β < 0 that satisfies b (β) = 0. Since
β < 0 satisfies [SOC], we obtain existence. For the uniqueness of β, it suffices to show
















































We next show βI < β < βO < 0 < γ < γI , C < 0 < B and BCβIγIβOβγ 6= 0.
0 < γ = λγI < γI follows by (C.1) and (C.3). We know β < 0 by the above argument.
C < 0 < B follows from [C] and [B]. βI < β < βO < 0 comes from the fact that β is a
convex combination of (βI , βO) and
b (λβI) =




b (βI) =− 1− λ
θ3
κ (κd + κ)
2 {κsκ2 (2θ + θD) + κθθ2D
+κdκsκ (2θ + θD) + γ (κd + κ)κs (2θ + θD) (θ + θD)} < 0.
Finally, we show BCβIγIβOβγ 6= 0. γβIγI 6= 0 follows from the closed form solutions
(C.1) and (C.3). BCβ 6= 0 is proven by contradiction next. βO 6= 0 follows from β 6= 0.
To show β 6= 0, suppose β = 0. Then, the dealer's objective is
max
p
(s− α− γz)E [d|z] + p (α + γz)− θD
2
(s− α− γz)2 V [d|z] .
For equilibrium price to exist for all z ∈ R, α = γ = 0, a contradiction to γ > 0.
To show B 6= 0, suppose B = 0. Then, the price function tells nothing about the signal
z. Then the aggregate demand becomes
xB (z, p) =
κd
θ












⇒ 0 = γ (κd + κ) + κd + λκ
θ
(θDγ + κ) > 0,
a contradiction.
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To see C 6= 0, suppose C = 0. Since B 6= 0, the price function fully reveals z.




















− (κd + κ)
}
p
⇒xB (z, p) = 1
θ
{















Given xB (z, p) = α + βp + γz, β 6= 0, and B 6= 0, three possibilities have to be considered.
If [SOC] is met, the optimal pricing is given by (C.4). Hence,
θDβ
γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ) = 0⇒ β = 0,











0, β = 2κd+κ
θD
. The dealer's objective function becomes
arg max
p
(s− α− βp− γz)E [d|z] + p (α + βp+ γz)− θD
2
(s− α− βp− γz)2 V [d|z]
= arg max
p
{α + γz + 2 (κd + κ) (s− α− γz − E [d|z])} p.
There is no way for the coefficient of p to be 0 identically for all s and z, implying there is
no optimal price in this case.
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C.2 Proof of proposition 3.1





























































































s− xB (z, p))2)
Combining these results, the objective function related to p is
(








s− xB (z, p))2 .












C.3 Proof of proposition 3.2
Note that the explicit form of x (z, s) = xB (z, p (z, s)) is
x (z, s) = α + βA+ (βB + γ) z + βBCs.
For the first result limθD→∞ x (z, s) = s, recall the system of characterizing Eq. [A], [B],
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and [C]. By taking θD →∞,
[A] : A =
−α
β
, [B] : B =
−γ
β
, [C] : C = −1
γ
.
In other words, βBC = 1, βB + γ = 0, and α + βA = 0. Hence, as θD →∞, x (z, s)→ s.
For the second result limθD→0 x (z, s) = 0, note that from [C] and βI < β < 0, C → 0 as
θD → 0. By substituting C = 0 into {[α] , [β] , [A] , [B]},
[α] : α =
κdd¯
θ




[β] : β = −κd + κ
θ








2 (κd + κ)










, β = −λκd + κ
θ






solve the system and α + βA = βB + γ = βBC = 0. Hence, x (z, s)→ 0 as θD → 0.
C.4 Proof of theorem 3.2
We prove each of the four claims in order.
Price informativeness
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γ (κd + κ)− β (θDγ + κ)
θDβ
=
γ (κd + κ)
θDβ
− γ − κ
θD
.
To show Q decreases, it suffices to show β < 0 is decreasing in θD. The range of Q comes







We show β is decreasing by the implicit function theorem. Denote b (β) in Eq. (C.6) by
b (β, θD). The goal is to show
∂β
∂θD
= −∂b (β, θD) /∂θD
∂b (β, θD) /∂β
< 0.
Since b (β) crosses horizontal line from below at the equilibrium β < 0, ∂b(β,θD)
∂β
evaluated at
the equilibrium β < 0 is always strictly positive. Hence, by the implicit function theorem,
it suffices to check ∂b
∂θD
evaluated at the equilibrium β < 0 is positive. By using β3 =
− 1
b3











































By direct calculation, with Ψ := θ2θ2D + κsκ (θ












2 (κd + κ)














κsκ (κd + κ)
{
λ2 (θ + θD)




(1 + λ) θ2 + λθθD
}
+ κdθ
2θ2D {1 + λ (2− λ)}+ 4κdθ3θD
]
> 0,






2θD (κd + κ)
2 (1− λ) {2θ + (1 + λ) θD}
θΨ
> 0.
These results imply that the quadratic function ∂b(β)
∂θD
is decreasing and positive on [βI , λβI ].





V (p (z, s))− lim
θD→0
























2 (2λ− 1) (κd + κ)κ2s + θ4κ {(2κ + κd)λ2 + κd (2λ− 1)}κs + θ6 (κd + κ)
κs (κd + κ) {κsκλ2 (κd + κ) + (κd + λκ) θ2}2
.
Note that the denominators of the last expression is positive. From the second equality, if
2λ − 1 ≥ 0, there is no restriction on κs. If 2λ − 1 < 0, the numerator of the ratio after
the last equality is a concave quadratic function of κs with a positive intercept. Hence, by
taking small enough κs, the numerator is positive.
Welfare of the traders
Fix a positive θD = θ¯D > 0 and its associated equilibrium price p (z, s). Note that the traders
can always choose demand functions to be identically 0 by selecting αI = βI = γI = αO =
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βO = 0. Hence, the equilibrium interim utilities satisfy
E
[
−e−θ(d−p(z,s))xBI (z,p(z,s))|p (z, s) , z
]





≥ E [−e−θ(d−p(z,s))×0|p (z, s)] = −1.
The right sides of the inequalities are the ex-ante welfare when θD → 0 by proposition 3.2.
By taking expectation on both sides and using the tower property, the proof completes.
Welfare of the dealer
When Y is an n× 1 vector distributed N (µ,Σ) and A is an n× n matrix,
EY ′AY = Etr (Y ′AY ) = tr (AEY Y ′) = tr {A (Σ + µµ′)} .
Since the profit of the dealer is a quadratic form of uncertainty X, by using this property,
we can calculate the expected profit of the dealer in terms of coefficients (α, β, γ, A,B,C).







2 + θ2) + κκsλ+ θ
2)
κs (κd + κ) {κsκλ+ θ2 (1 + λ)} > 0.
C.5 Proof of proposition 3.3
The proof is by guess and verify, and is composed of three parts: the trader's problem, the







= A0 + Axx
D
t−1 +B (zt + C
′st) .
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Note that xDt−1 is the endogenous state.
Traders' problem
Guess the form of value function of the informed traders is, for some nonzero constant αI ∈ R
and symmetric matrix QI ,
J
(





























and pt are functions of (zt, st) and qI is a quadratic
form. Note that although informed traders cannot observe sDt , J depends on s
D
t through pt.











The equilibrium xDt is measurable with respect to F It due to market clearing xIt + xDt = x¯ in































Since there are three control variables, we solve the problem in three steps. The first step is
to substitute out risk-free bond yt. Note that mIt+1 can be written as
mIt+1 = (dt+1 −Rpt)xt +RptxIt−1 + sItdIt+1 +RmIt −Rct
































where NI is a matrix function of QI and (nI0, nI) are linear functions of other non-random
variables such as xt. Second, given the normality assumption, this term is an increasing






















where (µI ,ΣI) are conditional moments





]′ |zt] , ΣI = V [dt+1, dIt+1, zt+1, st+1|zt]








independent of pit. This step also yiels the
asset demand
xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxss
I
t + qx0
where (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) are functions of (A0, Ax, B, C,QI). The third step is to maximize
over profit pit the objective function
max
pit




























Substituting pit into the objective function leads to
J
(
xt−1,mIt ; zt, st
)




























This has to be identical to the original guess so that
θIαIR
θI + αIR
= αI ⇒ αI = R− 1
R
θI .









can be written as














pt = A0 + Axx
D
t−1 +B (zt + C
′st)


























|I − ΣINI |−
1








where i11 is 5 × 5 matrix with (1, 1) element being 1 and all other elements being 0. Since
Q˜I is a function of QI , this equation pins down the fixed point.
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Dealer's problem





































Dealers do not observe sIt , but it affects value through the demand schedule
xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxss
I































xt = x¯− (qxppt + qxz zˆt + qx0)
The steps to solve the problem is similar to those in the traders' problem, except that the
choice variable contains price. First, by deleting risk-free bond,
mDt+1 = (dt+1 −Rpt)xt +RptxDt−1 + sDt dDt+1 +RmDt −Rct
185





































′ (Σ−1D −ND)−1 (nD +NDµD (zˆt)) ,
where ND is a matrix function of QD, nD0 is a linear function of (xt, x2t , ptxt), nD is a linear
function of xt,





]′ |zˆt] , ΣD = V [dt+1, dDt+1, zt+1, st+1|zˆt] .
By substituting the demand schedule, the problem reduces to a minimization of a quadratic





































and the optimal pricing is











































































and the coefficients of the pricing decision becomes a function of (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) and has
to coincide with the initial guess




t−1 = A0 + Axx
D
t−1 +B (zt + C
′st) .
Fixed point
Given the price coefficients (A0, Ax, B, C), the informed agents' problem gives a fixed point
equation of QI . (A0, Ax, B, C,QI) determines coefficients of xI , (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0) . Given
(qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0), the dealer's problem gives a fixed point equation forQD. (qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0, QD)
then determines (A0, Ax, B, C). One can solve the fixed point (QI , QD, A0, Ax, B, C, qxp, qxz, qxs, qx0)
numerically by repeating the loop until convergence. Once the fixed point is obtained, the
transition of xDt can be obtained from
pt = A0 + Axx
D
t−1 +B (zt + C
′st) , xIt = qxppt + qxzzt + qxss
I
t + qx0, x
D
t = x¯− xIt .
By substituting xIt and pt out, the transition of x
D
t is obtained by
xDt = x¯− qx0− qxpA0− (qxpB + qxz) d¯− qxpAxxDt−1− (qxpB + qxz)
(
zt − d¯
)− qxpBC ′st− qxssIt .
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One can define
ρ0 := x¯−qx0−qxpA0−(qxpB + qxz) d¯, ρ1 := −qxpAx, Dt := − (qxpB + qxz)
(
zt − d¯
)−qxpBC ′st−qxssIt .
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